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A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus
Statute
LARRY W. YACKLEt

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (Pub. L.
104-132), signed into law on April 24, 1996, represents Congress'
attempt to deal with the problems deemed to beset federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners. This new statute addresses many important aspects of habeas law and practice and, as to them, now occupies the field to the exclusion of previous arrangements-whether
developed as a construction of preexisting statutes or as interstitial
decisional law. On the whole, however, Pub. L. 104-132 presupposes the basic framework now in place. This matter-of-fact point
(that the new statute takes the preexisting habeas landscape as its
baseline) will be of vital significance for the interpretive task that
lies ahead.
That task will not be easy. The new law is not well drafted. It
bears the influence of various bills that were fiercely debated for
nearly forty years. Along the way, proponents of habeas legislation
adjusted their initiatives in light of contemporaneous events and
circumstances: the Powell Committee Report in 1989, for example,
as well as shifting levels of political support for particular measures and new Supreme Court decisions on point. Proponents often
kept abreast of the times by adding new elements to their bills
without, at the same time, reexamining old formulations in order
to maintain an intellectually coherent whole. The result, I am
afraid, is extraordinarily arcane verbiage that will require considerable time and resources to sort out.
Pub. L. 104-132 will require a practical, problem-solving brand
of construction that makes this new law fit into an overarching system of federal jurisdiction that promises to work--with limited disruptions and in fairness to all. For my part, the Supreme Court's
approach to the problem in McFarlandv. Scott,1 is a good illustration.2 The statutes before the Court in that instance were hardly a
t Professor of Law, Boston University. I would like to thank John Blume, Kevin Driscoil, Tim Ford, Eric Freedman, Steve Garvey, Mark Olive, Ron Tabak, and especially
George Kendall and James Liebman for help and guidance. Brandes Taylor and Wayne

Serra helped with research.
1. 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994).

2. Readers are entitled to know that I filed an amicus brief in McFarlandon behalf of
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marvel of clarity, and it was possible to read them in a manner
that produced inconvenience and unfairness. Yet the Court managed to achieve a sensible result. That is the kind of judicial pragmatism that will be needed in the elaboration of Pub. L. 104-132. 8
In this early treatment of the new statute, I want to review the
principal adjustments Pub. L. 104-132 makes to the process of federal habeas adjudication. But then I mean to focus primary attention on the provision that has drawn the lion's share of attention,
both in Congress and in professional and academic circles. Previously, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) governed the effect the federal habeas
courts must give to state court findings of historical fact. Pub. L.
104-132 has now reconfigured that section to prescribe the effect
the federal courts must give to prior state court judgments on the
merits of federal claims:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determina4
tion of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State proceeding.

This new provision goes not to the process by which the federal courts adjudicate claims, but to the substance of the federal
courts' judgment on the merits. This is to say, § 2254(d) covers the
the American Civil Liberties Union, in which I endorsed the interpretation that Mandy
Welch persuaded the Court to place on the statutes involved in that case. While it is true
that the prisoner was successful in McFarland,the point I am making here about pragmatic
statutory interpretation is neutral with respect to outcomes. Cf. West Virginia University
Hosp. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (1991) (explaining that ambiguous statutes should be
construed "to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably
into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law.. .[and thus] to make sense
rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris").
3. Of course, the hard work will fall on federal district and circuit courts. Congress has
acted and will hardly be inclined to take habeas up again any time soon, irrespective of the
problems its product raises. The Supreme Court will be available to resolve any divisions of
authority that develop. But the country can scarcely wait for the Court itself to address in
the first instance the many questions presented.
4. While paragraph (1) of this new version of § 2254(d) has drawn more attention to
date, paragraph (2) may in time prove just as significant. On its face, paragraph (2) invites
the federal courts to reopen a state court's adjudication of the facts underlying a federal
claim in order to determine whether the state court reasonably assessed the evidence. And
this notwithstanding the general rule that state court findings of historical fact are presumptively correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), as amended by Antiterrorism and Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) [hereinafter as amended].
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ground previously ruled by the Court's decisions in Brown v. Allen,5 Teague v. Lane,' and subsequent cases in the Teague line.
Federal habeas corpus for state prisoners has always been guided
both by Congress and by the Court, each contributing in its own
time and place to the formulation and evolution of controlling
principles. 7 This new statute is yet another instance of that familiar pattern.
The point to keep in mind is that § 2254(d) must be reconciled with the other provisions of Pub. L. 104-132 enacted with it,
with the provisions of existing law that Pub. L. 104-132 leaves untouched, with the current of legislative history from which this
particular provision emerged, and with the explanation for Pub. L.
104-132 in general (and this section in particular) offered by its
proponents at the time of passage. This new provision does make a
change, of course, but it is only this. Previously, the familiar statement of a federal court's duty to determine a prisoner's federal
claim "de novo" left the impression that the federal court was to
act without any necessary or explicit reference to a prior state
court judgment. Now, under § 2254(d), a federal court does not
begin entirely afresh, but takes a previous state court judgment as
the starting point for federal habeas adjudication. That federal adjudication remains independent; it is just that the question on
which independent federal judgment is brought to bear is whether,
after adjudicating the merits of the claim, the state court reached
the correct conclusion.
Under § 2254(d), a federal court is not to take up a claim as
though it were writing on a clean slate, perhaps mentioning a previous state court judgment in passing. By contrast, the federal
court is to begin with the work already done on the claim in state
court and ask, first and foremost, whether the state court arrived
at the correct outcome. In this way, the federal court takes serious
account (but not controlling account) of the best available thinking
on the claim at bar-the prior adjudication of that very claim in
state court. This framework for the federal courts' function in
habeas corpus is related to, but plainly distinguishable from, the
hierarchical structure of a routine appellate jurisdiction to review
state court judgments for error.
I confess that I had expected this Congress to attack the conventional role of federal habeas more vigorously, installing, per5. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
6. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
7. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79-81 (1977). See generally Barry Friedman,
A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction,85 Nw. U.
L. Rnv. 1 (1990).
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haps, something approaching the model that Justice Thomas has
advocated-under which a federal court would defer to a prior
state court adjudication of the merits that can be said to be "reasonable."" As it turns out, however, proponents of that position
failed to muster the necessary votes. If we put aside what some of
us thought Congress would do and to start looking (closely) at
what Congress has actually done, I think we will find that there is
more bark in this dog than bite. The enacted version of this substantive provision is different from versions of the past-different
in crucial ways that, if properly understood, retain the federal
courts' conventional function.
Fairly read according to its literal terms and the negotiations
that produced those terms, § 2254(d) respects a federal court's authority to award habeas relief on the basis of a meritorious claim,
notwithstanding a previous state court decision against the prisoner-provided the federal court concludes that the prior state
judgment was "contrary to" federal law as "clearly established" by
the Supreme Court. A state court decision can be "contrary to"
federal law in at least two ways-because the state court invoked
an incorrect legal standard or because it applied the correct standard but still reached an erroneous result.9 Either way, federal
habeas corpus relief is available. For § 2254(d) establishes no general rule of deference to "reasonable" state court decisions on
questions of federal law or on mixed questions of law and fact.
Previous attempts to establish such a rule of deference to the state
courts were unsuccessful. Accordingly, proponents made a calculated decision to drop those attempts in order to win passage of a
general habeas bill in this Congress. I will explain and defend this
thesis in the sections that follow.
Initially, in Parts I and II, I will survey the procedural changes
that Pub. L. 104-132 makes in habeas law. That discussion is not
only important for its own sake, but also for the context it establishes for approaching § 2254(d). As it turns out, the bulk of the
provisions in Pub. L. 104-132 are procedural reforms ostensibly
meant to expedite the process by which the federal courts adjudicate claims-particularly in death penalty cases. Those procedural
measures would be unintelligible if § 2254(d) undermined the federal courts' authority to determine the merits of claims when they
are presented seasonably and in a proper procedural posture. The
proponents of Pub. L. 104-132 certainly disclaimed any such pur8.

E.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (dictum).

9. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1994) (recognizing that a federal district judge may
reconsider pre-trial orders entered by a magistrate judge to determine whether factual findings are "clearly erroneous" and whether legal judgments are "contrary to law").

1996]

THE NEW HABEAS CORPUS STATUTE

pose and, by contrast, repeatedly reassured their colleagues that
their sights were trained on the procedural shortcomings they perceived in the system. 10
Beginning in Part I, I will tackle § 2254(d) itself. This new
section in Chapter 153 neither withdraws the federal courts' jurisdiction to entertain petitions from state prisoners, nor repudiates
the writ's exemption from the full faith and credit statute. It
neither saddles habeas corpus with strategic rules borrowed from
the law of official immunity, nor confers on the lower federal courts
a diluted appellate jurisdiction to review state court decisions for
error. By contrast, § 2254(d) fits rather neatly into the structure
that has characterized federal habeas adjudication for decades.
In Part IV, I will explain that § 2254(d) displaces the Teague
doctrine in the main, albeit some of the features of that doctrine
are reflected in the new law. In Teague, the Supreme Court reacted to the notorious delays that attended habeas litigation under
the Habeas Corpus Act as it had existed for decades. Pub. L. 104132 acknowledges the same problems, but responds in a different
way. Rather than adjusting the federal courts' attitude toward
prior state judgments to account for delays, the new law attempts
forthrightly to move things along. Pub. L. 104-132 thus alters the
statutory baseline that Teague took as its premise. Remnants of
the Teague doctrine survive, but primarily only in the conditions
that § 2254(d) establishes for its own application in a particular
case.
In Part V, I will chart the legislative history behind Pub. L.
104-132 and demonstrate that the statute that emerged this year
was the product of three significant compromises-compromises
that, in turn, abandoned previous efforts to deprive the federal
courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions from state convicts, to
give state court decisions on the merits preclusive effect in federal
court, and, finally, to force the federal courts to defer to "reasonable" state court decisions on legal and mixed questions. Finally, in
Part VI, I will distinguish arguably analogous lines of authority
that might be thought to support a different construction of
§ 2254(d).

10. See infra notes 52-54, 66, 70, 172-192 and accompanying text.
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PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS: BOTH CAPITAL AND NONCAPITAL
CASES

A. Innovations Regarding the Exhaustion of State Remedies
Pub. L. 104-132 confirms the general requirement that a prisoner attacking a state conviction or sentence must exhaust state
remedies before seeking federal relief.11 Yet it modifies existing law
in two respects. First, the new statute authorizes a federal court to
deny relief on the merits, despite a prisoner's failure to exhaust
state remedies.12 When, however, a federal court initially thinks a
claim is meritorious, the court may not act promptly but must
withhold judgment while the prisoner first seeks relief in state
court.1
Second, Pub. L. 104-132 provides that while a state may waive
the exhaustion requirement in any case, a federal court may not
infer a waiver from a state's failure to insist on exhaustion. Rather,
a waiver can only be found on the basis of an express statement by
the authorized state's attorney. 14 This apparently overrules a portion of Granberry v. Greer,1 5 the Supreme Court decision holding
that a federal court may overlook a prisoner's failure to exhaust in
cases in which the state does not raise the exhaustion point.
These innovations enhance a state's ability to use the exhaustion doctrine to its advantage. In cases in which a state's attorney
is confident that a claim lacks merit and thus is primarily concerned that the claim should be determined quickly, he can simply
waive the usual rule that a prisoner must first take the claim to
state court. When, however, a state's attorney anticipates that the

federal court may find a claim to be meritorious, he may insist that
the state courts be consulted-safe in the knowledge that, absent
express waiver, a federal
court cannot grant relief without de0
manding exhaustion.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c), as amended.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), as amended.
13. Apparently, the point is to conserve resources, but only if the prisoner is due to
lose. If it appears that the prisoner has a meritorious claim, Pub. L. 104-132 means that the
state courts should be invited to make that judgment.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3), as amended.
15. 481 U.S. 129 (1987).
16. It is fair to say that this contingent arrangement adds to the time required to dispose of a claim in order to protect the state's litigation interests. I have argued elsewhere
that arrangements of this kind risk skewing federal judgments on the merits-by encouraging federal courts to find claims to be frivolous in order to dispose of them summarily without triggering the (often time-consuming and arduous) exhaustion of state remedies. Larry
W. Yackle, The Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposals,68 IowA L. REv. 609,
635 n.120 (1983).
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B. Filing Deadlines in General
Pub. L. 104-132 requires a prisoner attacking a state conviction to file in federal court within one year-running from the latest of several events, typically from the conclusion of direct review.
The filing period is tolled during any interval when a prisoner is
pursuing postconviction relief in state court.1 7 The new law does
not define "direct review," and that term will have to be interpreted for these purposes (and within the context of each state's
appellate system). One key issue is likely to be whether "direct review" includes certiorari proceedings in the Supreme Court.18
Filing deadlines of this kind are open to criticism. Aside from
the obvious problems, 9 they are in tension with various other rules
of federal habeas practice. Consider, for example, that under Rose
v. Lundy, 20 the exhaustion of state remedies is no longer claimspecific; rather, an entire petition will be dismissed if any of its
multiple claims fails the exhaustion test. The idea in Lundy is to
encourage prisoners to slow down litigation of some claims until all
are ready for federal adjudication. Yet under this provision in Pub.
L. 104-132, a prisoner may be faced with a filing deadline with respect to some claims even though she has not yet completed state
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2244, as amended.
18. It would be sensible, I think, to give "direct review" the meaning the Court gives to
"final" judgments-which would include seasonable certiorari proceedings. See Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987). Note also that a parallel provision in § 2263 (newly
added by Pub. L. 104-132) runs a filing period from "final state court affirmance of the
conviction and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." See infra note 45 and accompanying text. By negative implication, the more general
reference here to the conclusion of "direct review" is not limited to proceedings in state
court, but extends as well to proceedings before the Supreme Court of the United States.
19. Petitioners who are serving prison sentences already have every incentive to file for
federal relief as soon as possible. Reliable data indicate that noncapital applicants do file
within a year or two and, accordingly, that a strict new filing deadline is unnecessary. Noncapital prisoners typically have no lawyers at this stage and thus will find it difficult to meet
a filing deadline.
Proponents insist, of course, that prisoners under sentence of death have an incentive
to delay-simply to postpone the final determination of their claims and, accordingly, their
ultimate execution. Moreover, death row prisoners are entitled to counsel under current law
and thus may be in a position to respond to new incentives for filing early. Nevertheless, the
lawyers who represent capital clients at this stage are not the same lawyers who handled
earlier proceedings in state court. These new lawyers must be recruited to appear on prisoners' behalf only at this stage. Good lawyers may hesitate to come into complex death penalty
litigation if it appears that they must set aside other responsibilities in order to investigate
the basis for prisoners' claims, marshal the evidence, and prepare legal arguments and documents in a short space of time. A strict filing deadline will make it even more difficult than
it now is to get competent lawyers to assume this critical responsibility.
20. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

litigation with respect to others.2 1
The new statute also establishes similar filing deadlines for a
prisoner attacking a federal conviction or sentence pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255. The delays that have raised concerns in recent
years have arisen in cases involving state prisoners in capital cases.
Nevertheless, the deadlines in Pub. L. 104-132 cover federal prisoners serving prison terms.2 2
C. Limits on FederalEvidentiary Hearings
Pub. L. 104-132 makes significant changes in current law regarding the ability of state prisoners to obtain federal evidentiary
hearings in order to develop the facts underlying their claims.23
Both the previously controlling statute and the Supreme Court's
25
24
decisions from Townsend v. Sain to Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes
are affected.
Initially, the new statute confirms the requirement that a federal court must typically presume that a state court's finding of
historical fact is correct, as well as the rule that a prisoner can
rebut that presumption only by producing "convincing" evidence.20
Under preexisting law, however, the presumption in favor of a
state factual finding was contingent on sound process in state
court. The prior statute contained a list of procedural standards
that a state proceeding must meet if its results were to have the
benefit of the presumption in federal court. Read literally, Pub. L.
104-132 eliminates any federal standards for the fact-finding process in state court and thus ostensibly establishes a presumption in
favor of a state finding of fact, without regard for the process from
which it was generated. A regime of that kind may, of course, raise
serious due process questions-at least in some cases2
21. Perhaps Pub. L. 104-132 assumes that all claims available to a prisoner can and will
proceed through state court in the same way and on the same timetable. That is not necessarily the case.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as amended (allowing one year from the date on which the conviction judgment becomes final-subject to specified tolling provisions).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e), as amended.
24. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
25. 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e), as amended. The new law insists that rebuttal evidence must
be both "convincing" and "clear," but I doubt that difference is consequential.
27. President Clinton mentioned the constitutional issue this provision might raise in
his statement on the day he agreed to Pub. L. 104-132:
If [§ 2254(e) (as amended)] were read to deny litigants a meaningful opportunity
to prove the facts necessary to vindicate federal rights, it would raise serious constitutional questions. I do not read it that way. The provision applies to situations
in which 'the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis' of his or her claim.
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In addition, Pub. L. 104-132 apparently overrules TamayoReyes. In that case, the Supreme Court held that if a prisoner's
attorney failed to develop the material facts when given an opportunity to do so in state court, the prisoner could obtain a federal
evidentiary hearing to develop those facts if the prisoner showed
"cause" for counsel's "default" in state court and "actual
prejudice" resulting from the default, or if the prisoner demonstrated that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" would occur if
a federal hearing were not held.28 In this context, a prisoner could
demonstrate such a "miscarriage of justice" by showing that he
was probably innocent. 29 The Tamayo-Reyes decision itself drew
criticism for saddling a prisoner with the mistakes of his lawyer. In
any case, the new statute restricts the availability of federal hearings even more.
Under Pub. L. 104-132, a prisoner who failed to develop the
facts in state court can obtain a federal hearing only on a showing
that: (1) either the claim rests on a "new" rule of law that "the
Supreme Court" has made "retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review" or on a "factual predicate" that could not have
been discovered previously by "due diligence;" and (2)-"the facts
underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense."3 0
Taken literally, the conjunctive "and" preceding this last requirement limits federal evidentiary hearings to prisoners who not
only offer a good reason why the facts were not developed in state
Therefore, [§ 2254(e)(as amended)] is not triggered when some factor that is not
fairly attributable to the applicant prevented evidence from being developed in
State court. Statement of the President, Office of the Press Secretary, April 24,
1996 [hereinafter cited as Signing Statement].
28. 504 U.S. at 11-12.
29. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
30. This awkward formulation is evidently meant to incorporate something of the standard that Pub. L. 104-132 uses elsewhere, in 28 U.S.C. § 2244, as amended, as part of the
test for deciding whether a prisoner can file a second or successive federal habeas petition.
See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. The fit, however, is not good. In that context,
the prisoners concerned have had one opportunity to litigate in federal court. That is not
necessarily true here-in the case of prisoners seeking evidentiary hearings. I would have
thought, accordingly, that the standard here would be less rigid. Inexplicably, it is even
more Draconian. Under § 2244(b)(2)(A), a prisoner who wishes to file a second habeas application may do so if her claim rests on a "new" and "retroactive" rule of constitutional
law-whether or not the claim is related to innocence in the manner prescribed in the language I have reproduced in the text. Here, by contrast, if a prisoner seeks a federal hearing
on the ground that her claim relies on a "new" and "retroactive" rule, the "facts underlying
the claim" must go to innocence in this special sense.
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court, but also can demonstrate that those facts would have persuaded any "reasonable" judge or jury to acquit the prisoner of the
underlying offense. In effect, only prisoners who can make a persuasive showing of factual innocence can obtain a federal evidentiary hearing into facts that may support a constitutional claim. If
a prisoner cannot do that, the federal court must proceed on the
basis of the state court record, whatever its value-and determine
the merits of the prisoner's claim even though some facts underlying the claim are unknown. Here, too, the new law's limits on federal fact-finding will be unconstitutional, I think, at least in some
instances.
D. Limits on Appellate Review
Pub. L. 104-132 restricts the ability of a prisoner who is unsuccessful at the district court level to appeal to a circuit court of
appeals.3 1 Under prior law, a prisoner attacking a state conviction
could appeal if some federal judge or justice issued a "certificate of
probable cause" indicating that at least one of the prisoner's claims
warranted appellate consideration. 2 A prisoner attacking a federal
conviction or sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 could appeal
without first obtaining such a certificate. The new statute makes
three changes in that regime.
First, under Pub. L. 104-132, only a circuit judge or a Supreme
Court justice may issue a "certificate of appealability. 3' The district judge who rejected the prisoner's claims at the district level is
barred from doing so. The rationale for this change escapes me. A
district judge who has just examined a claim on the merits would
seem to be in a good position to decide whether appellate review
would be worthwhile. A circuit judge or justice must necessarily
devote fresh time to a request for a certificate in order to achieve
the level of understanding that the district judge already has. It
may be that proponents are concerned that district judges now issue certificates without sufficient care, though I know of no data to
support that conclusion. 4
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2253, as amended.
32. For a discussion of the old law, see
§ 160 (1981).

LARRY

W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICrION REMEDIES

33. The shift of labels from a "certificate of probable cause" to a "certificate of appealability" is probably meant to avoid the "probable cause" terminology-when, under Pub. L.
104-132 (as well as under prior law), the standard is actually whether the prisoner makes a
substantial showing of the denial of a federal right. The new statute also contains an
amendment to Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which refers to the

issuance of certificates by district judges. But that is almost certainly an oversight.
34. It is also possible that this innovation is meant to reduce the incidence of certifi-
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Second, a certificate that is issued must "indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy" the new standard. This, it seems, is
meant to restrict appellate review to particular claims thought to
merit review and to prevent an appellate court that has accepted
an appeal with respect to one claim from considering any other
issues in the case. Third, under Pub. L. 104-132, the certificate requirement is extended to prisoners attacking federal convictions
and sentences pursuant to § 2255.
E. Limits on Successive FederalPetitions
Pub. L. 104-132 establishes rigid new rules that would eliminate most second or successive petitions from a single prisoner.5 5 A
claim that was presented in a previous federal petition but is offered again in a second or successive petition "shall be dismissed.""8 A claim raised for the first time in a second or successive petition may be considered-but only in narrow
circumstances. The prisoner must prove either (1) that the claim
rests on a "new" rule of constitutional law that "the Supreme
Court" has made "retroactive to cases on collateral review," or (2)
that its "factual predicate" could not have been discovered earlier
by the exercise of "due diligence" and that- "the facts underlying
the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,
would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder' 37would
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
cates-by giving the task of issuing them to judges whose workload will be expanded if they
respond positively. The new statute makes no attempt to discourage certificates by establishing a more demanding standard for federal judges to follow. The standard under Pub. L.
104-132 is substantially the same as under prior law: whether the prisoner "has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), as
amended. See, e.g., Stewart v. Beto, 454 F.2d 268, 270 n.2 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 925 (1972), cited with approval in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 800 (1983).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), as amended.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), as amended. Taken literally, this suggests that a claim must
be dismissed even if it was rejected when it was raised in a previous petition only because
the prisoner failed to exhaust state remedies. A dismissal for want of exhaustion is not on
the merits, but merely postpones federal adjudication. Accordingly, it would be extraordinarily harsh to read this new language to mean that when such a claim is raised again it must
be dismissed on the merits.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), as amended. This is roughly the same standard that Pub. L.
104-132 invokes to frustrate prisoners seeking federal evidentiary hearings. See supra note
30 and accompanying text. Arguably, however, this standard is more demanding, inasmuch
as, here, there is an express reference to proof of the relevant facts and the court is specifically instructed to view those facts "in light of the evidence as a whole"-presumably the
evidence going to guilt or innocence at trial. On the other hand, this standard governs prisoners who have by hypothesis already had one opportunity to be in federal court. The provi-
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These standards foreclose any but the most compelling second
or successive petition from the same prisoner. Formally at least,
the idea presumably is to encourage prisoners to aggregate all their
claims in a single petition and thus to discourage multiple trips
through the federal courts. Yet the demands made on any prisoner
who seeks a second chance are so great that it scarcely seems likely
that anyone could actually qualify.
Importantly, these standards are considerably more rigid than
the rules now applied by the Supreme Court-which have already
significantly diminished the successive-petition phenomenon. The
Court, of course, has recently changed the analysis and terminology it uses to deal with second and successive petitions, reconciling
the law in this field with the rules and standards used in cases on
the effect of procedural default in state court. The standards in
Pub. L. 104-132 conflict with those recent decisions.
First, under McCleskey v. Zant,3 8 a prisoner who can show
that she is probably innocent can file a second or successive petition without also showing "cause" for having failed to raise a claim
in a prior petition. Under Pub. L. 104-132, however, a prisoner
must show both something akin to "cause" and evidence undermining factual guilt. Second, under Schiup v. Delo,8 9 a prisoner
whose claim goes to the validity of a criminal conviction (as opposed to the validity of a sentence alone) may file a second or successive petition if she offers newly discovered evidence showing
that it is more probable than not that no reasonable jury would
have voted to convict, if the jury had seen the new evidence. Under
Pub. L. 104-132, however, such a prisoner must produce "clear and
convincing" new evidence that would have convinced any reasonable jury to acquit. That is the standard the Supreme Court has
reserved for claims that go only to the validity of a death
sentence.4 °
In addition, Pub. L. 104-132 erects new procedural hurdles for
filing second or successive petitions. Under prior law, a prisoner
could fie another petition so long as it met the standards established by the Court in cases like McCleskey and Schiup. Under
Pub. L. 104-132, by contrast, a prisoner must obtain permission
from a three-judge panel of circuit judges-before filing a second
or successive petition at the district court level. That panel of circuit judges may grant permission only if the prisoner makes a
sion on hearings undercuts a prisoner's ability to develop the facts underlying claims
presented in an initial application for federal relief.

38. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
39. 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
40. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
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prima facie showing that he satisfies the new standards for multiple petitions. Pub. L. 104-132 requires the circuit panel to act on
motions for permission to file successive petitions within 30 days
and makes the panel's decision final-not subject to review on
certiorari.41
II.

PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS: CAPITAL CASES ONLY

Pub. L. 104-132 contains special optional provisions for death
penalty cases only-which can be triggered by a state's willingness
to appoint counsel for indigent petitioners at the postconviction
stage in state court.42 These provisions build on structures sug41. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), as amended. The validity of this apparent attempt to strip
the Supreme Court itself of jurisdiction is now before the Court in Felker v. Turpin, cert.
grt'd., 116 S. Ct. 1588 (1996). It may be that this particular provision can be saved by construing it to leave intact the Court's jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions filed as an
original matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
I must say that I find these Byzantine rules and procedures for handling multiple petitions positively bizarre. They will work in one sense. In the end, they will force the dismissal
of almost all successive applications for federal relief. But they will not prevent desperate
death row prisoners from filing multiple petitions and, certainly, they will not limit the time
and resources devoted to habeas litigation. Quite the contrary. They invite even more litigation over whether petitions fit their narrow standards and thus squander the very resources
that habeas critics presumably want to conserve.
The new standards are the more puzzling for their inconsistency. Consider the case of a
prisoner who wishes to fie a second motion under § 2255, attacking a federal criminal conviction. One might have expected that Pub. L. 104-132 would require such a prisoner to
meet the same standards that a state prisoner filing a second habeas petition would have to
satisfy. The relevant amendment to § 2255 does specify that a second or successive motion
must be "certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals. . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as amended. Yet the circuit panel is not to decide whether the
prisoner has made a prima facie showing that he meets the substantive standards precisely
as they are set out in § 2244(b)(2). Instead, the panel is to certify whether a second or
successive § 2255 motion "contain[s]" either "newly discovered evidence" going to actual
innocence or a "new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive" by the Supreme Court.
With respect to the former possibility, this formulation is inexplicable as a matter of
policy (poor grammar to one side). It is more generous than the standards applicable to
habeas corpus cases controlled by § 2244(b)(2)(B). A state prisoner seeking habeas corpus
relief must advance not only evidence going to innocence, but also a good reason why that
evidence could not have been discovered earlier. This difference makes little sense.
Recall as well that the standards in § 2244(b)(2) for determining whether a state prisoner can file more than one habeas petition is more generous (in another way) than the
standards in § 2254(e)(2) for determining whether a state prisoner can obtain a federal evidentiary hearing respecting an initial habeas application. See note 30 supra. Frankly, I suspect that incompetent drafting is responsible for all this confusion.
42. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1221 (1996) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2261)
[hereinafter cited as 28 U.S.C. § 2261]. Three general charges may immediately be laid
against this kind of optional structure. First, an optional framework makes everything that
follows in the new chapter contingent on a state's voluntary decision. If a state does not
choose to cooperate, then all the "reforms" included in the new chapter come to nothing.
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gested by the Powell Committee in 1989, but often depart from the
Powell Committee's recommendations. The optional features present vexing practical questions, however, and they will generate
considerable litigation. Accordingly, it is worthwhile to consider
how they are apparently meant to function.43
It is far from clear what the states must do to trigger the special provisions in Pub. L. 104-132 for capital cases. The elements of
a qualifying scheme for counsel in state postconviction proceedings
will have to be worked out in litigation. Unlike other contingent
arrangements of this sort, Pub. L. 104-132 establishes no means by
which a state can assert that it has created such a mechanism.
There is nothing here, for example, calling on the Attorney General or a federal court to appraise what a state has done and to
certify compliance. Presumably, some states will take the position
that they comply immediately upon the enactment of the new fedSecond, a state's compliance with the requirements for triggering the optional chapter must
be monitored over time. Presumably, the applicability of the optional chapter's provisions
can be opened up and determined in each individual case. How else to ensure that a state
that is initially entitled to the advantages of the optional chapter continues to keep its part
of the bargain? Third, the optional chapter focuses exclusively on counsel in state postconviction proceedings and fails to address the more serious, persistent problems created by
incompetent lawyers who mishandle cases at trial and on appeal in state court. Those are
the stages of criminal proceedings at which constitutional claims should be raised and considered in a fair and thorough manner. Yet many states have failed to develop effective
systems for providing competent counsel at trial, even in capital cases.
The original bill in the Senate would have repealed the right to counsel in capital
habeas cases in federal court, 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (1994), and, instead, would have specified
that a federal court may appoint counsel (and approve support services) in its discretion. On
the floor, however, Senator Biden persuaded Senator Hatch to accept an amendment that
preserves the mandatory character of the counsel statute in death penalty cases. The new
statute, then, leaves the right-to-counsel aspects of McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568
(1994), intact.
Pub. L. 104-132 does contain an important restriction on the ability of counsel to obtain
federal funds for support services-e.g., investigators and experts. A "technical" section bars
a federal court from considering a request for that kind of funding ex parte, unless counsel
makes a "proper showing" of a "need for confidentiality." Critics argue that ex parts proceedings are needed in order to avoid disclosing defense strategies to the prosecution. It
remains to be seen what, if any, steps might be open to a federal court concerned that the
presence of the state's attorney would compromise counsel's ability properly to represent a
prisoner-client.
43. The optional portions of Pub. L. 104-132 are in substance relatively insignificant;
most of the important provisions in the new statute are lodged in its general sections and
thus are applicable to all cases, capital and noncapital, whether or not a state chooses to
invoke the special chapter for death cases. As a practical matter, accordingly, one wonders
whether the incentives will be sufficient to persuade many states to assume the costs of
providing counsel to indigents for state postconviction proceedings. Fortunately, most death
penalty states are beginning to offer counsel in those proceedings voluntarily, albeit the
competence of the attorneys provided, and certainly the financial support those attorneys
receive, remains to be demonstrated.
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eral statute, without the need for any determination or event.
That, I am afraid, will not only invite litigation over whether the
state's undertakings are sufficient, but will also raise other practical problems-that will, in turn, demand even more litigation to
resolve.44
Setting to one side these implementation problems, consider
the advantages that a state stands to gain in federal court-in exchange for its commitment to provide counsel to indigents in state
postconviction proceedings via a qualifying system.
A.

Filing Deadlines

Pursuant to Pub. L. 104-132, a death row prisoner in a state
that has invoked the death penalty chapter must file a federal
habeas petition within 180 days after the conclusion of direct review in state court. That six-month period is suspended while the
prisoner is seeking certiorari in the Supreme Court (on direct review), while state postconviction proceedings are pending, and for
an additional
period, not exceeding 30 days, on a showing of "good
' '4 5
cause.

44. Note, for example, that the filing deadlines I will describe in a moment are contingent on a state's status. 28 U.S.C. § 2261. If it is unclear whether a state has done what is
necessary to trigger the optional chapter, then it is equally unclear whether a prisoner has
the usual year, or just six months, in which to file a federal petition. Coupled with all the
other complications touching filing deadlines of any kind, the additional problems this kind
of provision will generate can hardly be overstated.
45. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1223 (1996) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2263). A deadline of this kind will be difficult to satisfy. Most death row prisoners are
indigent. While they are entitled to appointed counsel at federal expense pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 848(q) (1994), they often have no formal way to make contact with lawyers. Many
prisoners will not obtain representation until much of the time allotted for filing has
elapsed. Some may not find lawyers at all, until it is simply, and jurisdictionally, too late. Of
course, the tighter the timetable in any given case, the harder it will be to recruit an attorney ready, willing, and able to spring into action.
In addition, this deadline provision is not properly geared to other, related provisions.
This provision specifies that the 180-day time period begins to run when direct review is
complete, but it neglects to say when the state must appoint counsel for state postconviction
litigation. It appears, then, that a prisoner's time can begin to run and, indeed, can even run
out, before the state keeps its part of the bargain. To be sure, the filing period will be tolled
as soon as a lawyer is appointed and files a state postconviction action. By then, however,
the prisoner will have lost precious time without the professional assistance required to use
it.
The Powell Committee report on which these special provisions for capital cases are
based, as well as the original "contract" habeas bill in the House, would have run the 180day filing period from the date that counsel is appointed for state postconviction procedures. The drafters of Pub. L. 104-132 may have overlooked the difficulties that the shift to
the date on which direct review is completed creates. The confusion is exacerbated in that
§ 2265, which accommodates "unitary" systems of review in some states, plainly contem-

396
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Stays of Execution

The Powell Committee recommended that a death row prisoner should automatically be entitled to a federal stay of execution
until the federal courts have disposed of an initial federal petition.
If a stay is available without any special showing that a claim has
merit, lawyers and judges can be freed from the eleventh-hour
emergency litigation that now occurs when a state sets an execution date before the federal courts have had time to consider a
prisoner's claims. At first glance, Pub. L. 104-132 appears to incorporate the "automatic stay" idea, borrowing some of the very language the Powell Committee used. On closer examination, however, the new law promptly takes back what it initially offered. For
it discontinues any automatic stay as soon as the prisoner files a
federal petition-unless the prisoner makes a "substantial showing
of the denial of a Federal right. ' 4 That standard does not appear
demanding in the abstract. But its mere existence as a standard
means that lawyers and courts will continue to wage emergency litigation over stays of execution-the very stressful and burdensome
proceedings that the Powell Committee sought to avoid.47
C.

Cognizable Claims

The optional provisions in Pub. L. 104-132 restrict a federal
court to the consideration of claims that have previously been
raised and decided on the merits in state court, unless: (1)state
authorities prevented the prisoner from presenting a claim to the
state courts; (2)the claim rests on a "new" (and retroactively applicable) rule of constitutional law; or (3)the claim's factual predicate
could not have been discovered previously by the exercise of due
plates that the filing period begins only when counsel is appointed.
46. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1222-23 (1996) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.

§ 2262). The original "contract" bill in the House included the "automatic stay" provision
without this follow-on reservation. The reservation was added by amendment on the floor,

however, and became part of H.R. 729. From there, Senators Hatch and Specter picked it
up for use in S. 623 and S. 735. Then, it followed the rest of the provisions in S. 735 into
Pub. L. 104-132. See infra notes 179-182 and accompanying text.

47. Read literally, moreover, § 2262(c) appears to have it that if a district court concludes that the prisoner's claim fails the threshold standard, no other federal court can
thereafter issue a stay, unless the additional standards for filing a second or successive petition are met. The Powell Committee plan expressly contemplated that a stay would con-

tinue in place through all the usual stages of federal adjudication-the district level, the
circuit level, and, of course, the Supreme Court level. This enacted provision, by contrast,
appears to cut off appellate review of an initial district court decision. One should think that
it therefore raises essentially the same questions that are now before the court in Felker v.
Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 1588 (1996).
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diligence.48 These standards roughly reflect some, but not all, the
circumstances in which the Supreme Court permits a federal court
to consider a claim that was not, but might have been, raised in
state court. Conspicuously missing is the Supreme Court's rule
that a prisoner need not have a good reason for default in
state
49
court, if the prisoner shows that she is probably innocent.
D.

Timetables for Federal Court Action

Pub. L. 104-132 establishes strict timetables for federal court
action on petitions filed by death row prisoners in states that have
invoked the optional chapter. Generally, a district court is required
to render a decision within 180 days after a petition is filed, and a
court of appeals must determine any appeal within 120 days after
the reply brief is filed.50 The new statute allows for extensions, but
also creates numerous checks and reporting requirements to ensure
compliance with the timetables. The details of those provisions
warrant focused attention in cases in which they figure. Suffice it
to say that, here again, Pub. L. 104-132 invites substantial litigation-this time over the pace at which the federal courts dispose of
claims in death penalty cases.
E. Accommodation of "Unitary" Systems
Finally, Pub. L. 104-132 reconciles its optional scheme for capital cases (which assumes a system of state postconviction remedies
subsequent to appellate review in state court) with the "unitary"
systems adopted in some states (which combine direct appellate
review with state postconviction procedures).51 In this respect, too,
litigation will be necessary to sort through the implications of a
new federal statute on a state-by-state basis.
48. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1223 (1996) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2264)
[hereinafter cited as 28 U.S.C. § 2264].
49. E.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). There is no similar provision applicable to cases in states that have not triggered the optional chapter for death penalty
cases. That may only mean that Pub. L. 104-132 leaves the Court's ordinary procedural
default doctrine as it finds it-in cases not controlled by this special provision. E.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 477 U.S. 72 (1977). On the
other hand, Tim Ford has suggested the argument that this explicit provision in the optional chapter can be read to abrogate the Court's doctrine in all other instances by negative
implication.
50. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1224-1226 (1996) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2266).
51. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1123-1224 (1996) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2265).
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SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS

I come now to § 2254(d), which, of course, addresses not the
process by which a claim is considered in federal court, but the
substance of what the federal courts have authority to do on the
merits.
A.

The Basic Habeas Jurisdictionis Unaffected

At the outset, § 2254(d) clearly acknowledges and reinforces
the federal courts' longstanding jurisdiction to entertain habeas
petitions from state prisoners and to award habeas relief to prisoners who are found to be in custody in violation of federal law.
Nothing in the language of this provision, examined in the context
of the other new provisions enacted with it, nor anything in the
debates from which this provision emerged, suggests that Congress
has altered the basic framework established by Chapter 153 of the
Judicial Code. By its explicit terms, § 2254(d) presupposes the basic habeas jurisdiction established by the 1867 Act, now codified in
§ 2241 and reaffirmed in § 2254(a). Those provisions plainly confer power on the lower federal courts to determine prisoners' federal claims and to award relief when they find a claim meritorious,
and nothing in the new § 2254(d) or in any other provision of Pub.
L. 104-132 disturbs them in the slightest.
The proponents of Pub. L. 104-132 expressly disclaimed any
purpose to touch the habeas jurisdiction. In his opening statement,
the floor manager, Senator Hatch, said that his bill would "reform"
federal habeas corpus and explained that it would retain the jurisdictional basis under which the federal habeas courts enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 2 The bill, he said, would "correct some
of the deficiencies" in the current scheme-in particular the aspects of current law that Senator Hatch understood to permit
"frivolous appeals."5 3 In so doing, however, Hatch assured the Senate that the bill would "correct" flaws in the system, "while still
preserving and protecting the constitutional rights of those who
are accused."
Later, during the floor debates on the bill, the nonjurisdic52. 141 CONG. REc. S7479 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
53. Id. It seems plain that in this passage and others like it Senator Hatch used the

term "appeals" to include collateral proceedings in federal habeas corpus.
54. Id. Introducing the same habeas initiative when it returned from conference, Hatch
neglected § 2254(d) entirely and offered three procedural innovations as the bill's principal
contributions to habeas reform: filing deadlines, limits on successive petitions, and timetables for federal court action on applications from inmates on death row. 142 CONG. REC.
S3354 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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tional character of § 2254(d) was clarified when proponents distinguished it from a competing proposal by Senator Kyl. That
amendment was widely understood to have jurisdictional implications of the kind associated with the Tax Injunction Act and the
55
Johnson Act:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a judgment or
order of a State court shall not be entertained by a court of the United
States unless the remedies in the courts of the State are inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the person's detention.5 6

The debate was candid. Senator Kyl complimented Senators
Specter and Hatch for developing a bill that would make it more
difficult for state prisoners to press federal claims in the federal
district courts. Kyl complained, however, that the Hatch/Specter
bill was deficient in that it would not prevent state prisoners "from
going to Federal court" altogether. 57 Kyl was impatient with any
plan that would "play with [habeas corpus] around the edges by
proposing some time limits and providing for deference to State
court proceedings. 5 8 Under his amendment, by contrast, federal
habeas corpus would largely be abolished, and the only federal forum typically open to state prisoners would be appellate review in
the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari from a state
court system. 9
When Senator Biden protested that Kyl's amendment would
deny state prisoners even "one shot" in federal court, Senator Kyl
gave two responses. Initially, he reminded Biden that his amendment would permit a federal court to hear a prisoner's complaint
that the state remedies open to the prisoner were "not adequate or
fair."6' Yet Senator Kyl did not pretend that any such challenge to
state procedures would be successful in a serious number of instances. In the main, he offered that it would suffice to retain the
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988); see California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393

(1982) (reading the Tax Injunction Act to limit a federal court's jurisdiction to enjoin the
enforcement of state taxes); 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988); see Mountain States Power Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n of Montana, 299 U.S. 167 (1936) (reading the Johnson Act in a similar way).
56.
57.
58.
59.

141 CONG. Rac. S7829 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
Id.
Id. at S7830.
Senator Kyl's explicit statement may have been awkward and inarticulate, but his

meaning was unmistakable: "My amendment says: No, a Federal court prisoner adjudicates

his claims in Federal court. A State court prisoner adjudicates his claims in the State court.
The only time the State court prisoner can go to a Federal court is from an ultimate appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court." Id.
60. 141 CoNG. Rlc. S7803 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
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to review state court judgSupreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
61

ments for error on certiorari.

Anticipating the charge that the regime he envisioned would
be unconstitutional, Senator Kyl insisted that the Supreme Court's
decision in Swain v. Pressley,e2 sustaining a similar scheme in the
District of Columbia, would equally support such a plan for cases
involving prisoners convicted in the courts of the various states. In
this, he fully recognized and conceded that the consequence of his
program would be the practical elimination of federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners.6 3
Other Senators fully appreciated this point. Senator Lott, for
example, endorsed the Kyl amendment precisely because it would
go beyond procedural adjustments and "more deferential standards of review" and would address the "root cause" of "existing
problems of delay and abuse by eliminating these habeas corpus
reviews of State judgments."" Senator Hatch agreed that the Kyl
amendment would "effectively end Federal habeas review of State
convictions."6 5 Senator Specter, for his part, opposed the Kyl
amendment because he, too, understood that it would abolish the
federal courts' "jurisdiction to entertain questions on Federal is-

sues

....

6

61. Once again, Senator Kyl's response to Senator Biden was awkward but clear:
[T]he Senator from Delaware said he will be proposing an amendment that at
least gives the prisoner in the State court system one shot in the Federal
courts...
I would like to respond to this in a couple of ways. First of all, we do have one
shot in the Federal system under my amendment. It is directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. . . .So if a State court prisoner believes that, despite all of the hearings he has gotten in the State court system, he still has not gotten a fair shake,
and that [sic] he has really two things that he can claim-first, the State court
system is not fair, and secondly, he can go to the U.S. Supreme Court and make
his final point there.
Id.
62. 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
63. I am aware of no cases since Pressley in which prisoners convicted in the District of
Columbia have been permitted to seek federal habeas corpus relief in an Article IH court
thereafter.
64. 141 CONG. REc. S7835-01.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 87834. Both Senator Specter and Senator Hatch voted against the Kyl
amendment. Id. at S7849. In addition, Senator Hatch had this to say in connection with
another amendment by Senator Levin:
I mention [several cases said to illustrate his point] not because I advocate
abolition of Federal habeas corpus. It is clear that we protect it in the SpecterHatch antiterrorism bill. I am not advocating abolition of Federal habeas
corpus .... [R]esponsible scholars and lawyers and law enforcement professionals
do support banning and getting rid of Federal habeas corpus. There are many
bright people who think that this system is out of whack and that we do not need
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Given the clarity of the debate, there can be no question that
the Senate understood and appreciated the Kyl amendment's jurisdictional implications. Armed with that knowledge, the Senate
soundly defeated that amendment by a vote of 61 to 38.67 The
clear import of the debate on, and the defeat of, the Kyl amendment is that senators who wished to circumscribe the federal
courts' jurisdiction in habeas corpus found themselves in a decided
minority. I have to conclude that the bill that Congress ultimately
enacted, including § 2254(d), has no such effect.
B.

Habeas Remains Exempt from Preclusion

Neither the language nor the history of § 2254(d) suggests
that Congress has repealed the exemptions that federal habeas
corpus has always had from ordinary preclusion doctrine6 and
from the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738.69 Here
again, proponents' repeated endorsements of "postconviction"
habeas corpus make it perfectly clear that nothing of the sort is
afoot. 70 To the contrary, Congress deliberately rejected the very
notion that federal habeas corpus should be governed by a process
model, under which a federal court would be restricted to evaluating the adequacy of the procedures employed in state court. After
all, if the idea was to compel the federal courts to defer to state
court decisions on the merits reached after adequate state process,
there would have been no need for a separate provision like
§ 2254(d). State determinations of legal and mixed questions
would simply have been presumed correct along with state findings
of primary fact."
Other bills in recent years might well have been construed to
introduce some form of preclusion into the habeas context. Both
the Reagan and Bush Administrations proposed that the federal
courts should be barred from awarding habeas relief with respect
to a claim that has been "fully and fairly adjudicated" previously
Federal habeas corpus. But I am not arguing that position.
We have provided for protection of Federal habeas corpus, but we do it one
time and that is it-unless, of course, they can truly come up with evidence of
innocence that could not have been presented at trial.
Id. at S7826.
Returning to the Kyl amendment, Senator Hatch reiterated his view that while Kyl had
made a "strong point" that warranted "close scrutiny," he, Hatch, was unmoved: "I have to
say that I believe there needs to be postconviction habeas corpus review." Id. at S7836.
67. Id. at S7849.
68. See Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122, 124-25 (1968).
69. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982).
70. E.g., 141 CONG. REc. S7836 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Senator Hatch).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e), as amended. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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in state court.1 2 The "full and fair adjudication" standard is, of
course, the standard conventionally associated with preclusion
doctrine.7
The failure of the full-and-fair program provides the backdrop
for understanding the bill the 104th Congress has now enacted as
Pub. L. 104-132. I will explore that history below. 4 Suffice it to say
here that it is far from accidental that § 2254(d) is not the old fulland-fair plan. By contrast, this enacted statute was generated for
the very purpose of disclaiming the application of preclusion rules
to federal habeas.
C. A Federal Court Must Take Some Account of a Previous
State Court Judgment on the Merits
Obviously, § 2254(d) affects existing habeas law in some way.
No one would seriously contend otherwise. Just as obviously, however, the change that this provision concededly makes must be reconciled with the body of constitutional, statutory, and judge-made
law governing the work of the federal courts in general and federal
habeas corpus in particular. The crucial question is the nature and
measure of the significance § 2254(d) instructs a federal district
court to attach to a previous state judgment.
I have tossed this vital problem around with numerous colleagues7 5 and, to my mind at least, three possibilities are worth
talking about. First, § 2254(d) may accept the conventional framework of federal habeas corpus as it is, but may specify the approach a federal court is to take to a claim when a state court, for
its own purposes, has already examined the claim on the merits
and found it wanting. Second, § 2254(d) may discard the conventional architecture of habeas corpus and substitute the model associated with the doctrine of official immunity in civil actions for
damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Third, § 2254(d) may
transmute habeas corpus into an appellate jurisdiction, lodged in
the inferior federal courts, to review state court judgments for error. Let me work each of these through in turn.
72. See, e.g., S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 2709, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 605(d) (1989). See generally Yackle, supra note 16, at 620-628.
73. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-105 (1980) (explaining that a federal
court is typically precluded from considering a claim previously rejected in state court, un-

less the state courts failed to provide an opportunity for full and fair adjudication). For a
more detailed account of the "full-and-fair" program and its relation to preclusion, see generally Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2331 (1993).
74. See infra notes 142-171, 179-181 and accompanying text.

75. Most notably, George Kendall and James S. Liebman.
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1. The Conventional Habeas Model. Under the theory of
federal habeas corpus, a district court is exclusively concerned with
whether a prisoner is in custody in violation of federal law. The
validity of the prisoner's conviction in state court is implicated
only incidentally-because the custodian offers that conviction as
the explanation for the prisoner's current detention. Certainly, a
district court is not charged directly to review the state court conviction for error. And, most certainly, a district court is not entitled to reverse a previous state court judgment and to vacate and
remand with instructions-as though the state court were its
inferior.
Nevertheless, the availability of federal habeas as a sequel to
state court consideration of the same claim does, in the nature of
things, place a district court in position to second-guess the state
court. In this practical sense, postconviction federal habeas has an
undeniable appellate flavor. The great intellectual challenge has always been to reconcile the theoretical (original) nature of the federal courts' jurisdiction to issue the writ on behalf of state prisoners with the practical (appellate) character of the federal courts'
function when the state courts have previously adjudicated prisoners' claims.
Pub. L. 104-132 may not nail a resolution of this persistent
riddle down at every corner, but it may well contribute to a better
and clearer understanding of the federal courts' role within the
conventional habeas model. I will elaborate below on the way in
which I think the new statute adjusts the federal courts' work
within the traditional habeas model. First, however, I want to discuss its competitors in order to demonstrate that, for all its warts,
the conventional model still provides the most convincing account
of federal habeas corpus.
2.

The Official Immunity Model. Some observers have it that

§ 2254(d) transforms the habeas landscape in a radical fashion-by assimilating habeas cases into the model associated with
§ 1983 actions for damages. Under the decisions governing civil
suits of that kind, a plaintiff typically sues an executive officer for
violating the plaintiff's federal rights. The defendant typically responds in the alternative-contending, first, that she did not violate the plaintiff's rights at all, and, second, that, if she did, she
still enjoys a qualified immunity from suit for damages, because
she "reasonably" thought that she was acting consistent with federal law. On a motion for summary judgment, the defendant can
avoid a trial if she demonstrates that she behaved in an objectively
reasonable way-"assessed in light of the legal rules that were
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The plaintiff need not affirma-

tively plead that the defendant did violate "clearly established"
law."7 As a practical matter, however, such a flagrant departure
from federal standards is a necessary element of the plaintiff's
ability to put his claim for damages before the jury.
If § 2254(d) builds this model into federal habeas corpus, then
this new statute may mean that the elements of a state prisoner's
claim for habeas relief have now been changed. Until now, a prisoner was entitled to prevail if her claim was meritorious and
nonharmless. Now, an additional element has been introduced: the
federal court must conclude that the state court that previously
found the claim wanting could not "reasonably" have thought its
judgment was correct in light of "clearly established" federal law
to the contrary. In effect, by this account, § 2254(d) protects state
judges determining federal claims in state court in the way that
the law of qualified immunity shields executive officers administering state policies in the field. 8
It is only fair to say that some of the same language that appears in § 2254(d) can also be found in the qualified immunity
precedents. There, too, significance attaches to departures from
"clearly established" law.7" And, obviously enough, some of the
same intellectual problems that have arisen in habeas cases have
also surfaced in the qualified immunity context. There, too, as in
the Teague line of decisions, the Court has recognized that evolving legal standards (and the level of generality at which they are
defined) can have important implications." However that may be,
the Court has never run the two bodies of case law into each other,
76. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
77. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
78. I should say in passing that if this is the model on which § 2254(d) proceeds, then
this new provision should be inapplicable to cases in which it would upset reliance interests
in prior law. If a statute significantly changes the elements of a federal claim for relief, or,
for that matter, establishes a new defense to such a claim, its application would be retroactive in at least some instances and therefore would run into the conventional rule that statutes presumptively are read not to have retroactive effect. Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Products,
114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994). This paper is already long enough without taking on the additional
burden of assessing the applicability of Pub. L. 104-132's provisions to cases in which the
Landgraf analysis would be implicated. That burden is heavy; I will leave it to others.
79. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
80. See, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 312 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (citing
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)). I will argue below that § 2254(d) abrogates the Court's previous decisions holding that the federal habeas courts cannot enforce
"new" rules of law. That adjustment within habeas jurisprudence scarcely suggests that
§ 2254(d) somehow equally abrogates the analytical line between habeas and official

immunity.
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but rather has taken pains to keep them quite apart.8 1
In the immunity cases, the merit of the plaintiff's claim is typically assumed or, perhaps better said, irrelevant. What counts is
not whether the defendant acted unconstitutionally, but whether
her action, valid or not, was sufficiently egregious to warrant a jury
trial and, potentially, an award of compensatory damages. The
threat of trials and liability in other than extraordinary circumstances might discourage competent people from accepting executive positions or, having done so, from discharging their duties aggressively. Moreover, if executive officers could be routinely forced
to defend themselves at trial, "society as a whole" would have to
bear "the expenses of litigation" and "the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues ....,,2
That is what the immunity cases are about. "[T]he inquiry
into clearly established law as it pertains to qualified immunity" is
logically and practically limited to cases in which public officials
are faced with the "specter of damages liability for judgment calls
made in a legally uncertain environment." 83 It is to deal with
problems of that kind that the Court has created a "well-established, independent rule of law"84 requiring plaintiffs in civil damages actions to demonstrate, at the threshold of litigation, that
their allegations, if proved, reveal an extraordinarily flagrant violation of federal rights-of a nature that no responsible officer, operating in good faith, could countenance.
None of those considerations obtains in habeas corpus proceedings-as traditionally and conventionally understood. State
judges are not put on trial. Nor are they exposed to personal liability for their judicial decisions. Within the conventional habeas
corpus framework, state judges are not even formally involved. The
dispute with which the federal district court is concerned is between the petitioner and the custodian, who defends the prisoner's
detention on the basis of what state judges have done and thus
places their iwork under examination only indirectly. 85 In that pos81. Different considerations drive these two doctrines. In habeas corpus, the Court has
attended to "certain special concerns" touching the availability of collateral relief from state
judgments and, in so doing, has fashioned the Teague doctrine to strike the proper balance.
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 115 S. Ct. 1745, 1751 (1995). In the qualified immunity
cases, the Court has addressed equally "special," but plainly different, "federal policy concerns" relating to civil suits for damages. Id. See Kit Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualified
Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting the Course of Constitutional Law, 33 AR=u. L.
REv. 115 (1991).
82. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
83. Ryder v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2031, 2037 (1995).
84. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 115 S. Ct. 1745, 1751 (1995).
85. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991).
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ture, there surely is even less reason for invoking qualified immunity doctrine to shield state judicial judgments from (deflected)
federal examination than there would be for invoking that doctrine
to insulate any other ordinary, though perhaps defective, judicial
decision from any kind of appraisal."6 It simply makes no sense to
think that § 2254(d) immunizes state judges from nonexistent liability for reaching erroneous constitutional decisions.
If this is not enough to defeat the official immunity model for
use in habeas corpus, consider all the precedents already on the
books in which the Supreme Court has labored long and hard to
make these two different kinds of actions compatible. In Heck v.
Humphrey,8 7 for example, the Court recently held that a § 1983
suit for damages is unavailable to a plaintiff whose claim goes to
the validity of a criminal judgment-unless the plaintiff first manages to undermine that judgment in a habeas corpus action or by
some other means. The scenario the Court envisions is that a
plaintiff will initially seek and obtain a favorable decision in
habeas (in which case qualified immunity will play no role). Then
(and only then), the plaintiff will be entitled to sue the offending
state executive officer for damages (in which case that officer will
be entitled to defend on the basis of immunity). If by virtue of
§ 2254(d), a plaintiff must, in effect, meet the qualified immunity
standard in pursuing habeas relief, Heck would become unintelligible. An issue the Court has deliberately reserved for the subsequent § 1983 action would be jammed into the previous habeas
action-making the § 1983 action's treatment of it redundant or, if
you like, superfluous.
Finally, there is not a stitch of evidence that anyone in Congress proceeded with the immunity cases in view. Senator Hatch
did refer to Harlow v. Fitzgerald"s on one occasion, but only when
he was illustrating that the Supreme Court has employed a "reasonableness" standard in other contexts.8 9 That, indeed, would
have been the perfect occasion for Hatch to explain that his bill
would incorporate the immunity model into habeas. He said no
86. Cf. Ryder v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2031, 2037 (1995) (adopting precisely this
reasoning in rejecting an argument that a judgment rendered by unqualified military judges
might be sustained by analogy to the qualified immunity cases). If there is any analogy at all
between habeas corpus and § 1983 cases, it is not between habeas and civil actions for damages (where qualified immunity operates), but rather between habeas and civil actions for
injunctive relief (where qualified immunity is unavailable). See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S.
522 (1984) (rejecting a state magistrate's assertion of immunity from a suit for an
injunction).
87. 114 U.S. 2364 (1994).
88. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
89. 141 CONG. REc. S7848 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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such thing, but rather promptly resumed his argument that habeas
reform was needed to eliminate "frivolous appeal after frivolous
appeal"-particularly in death penalty cases.90 Certainly, Hatch
did not mention Heck or any other § 1983 case that would necessarily be affected by any turn to the immunity model. In the end,
§ 2254(d) simply cannot be read as an ill-conceived attempt to
borrow wholesale from another body of federal law, the features of
which defy any such effort.
3. The Appellate Model. Alternatively, § 2254(d) may mark
a different, but equally radical departure from the conventional
habeas corpus model. It is open to argue that this provision confers
on the inferior federal courts an entirely new appellate jurisdiction
to review state court decisions for error. Into the bargain,
§ 2254(d) may mean that in the exercise of this new appellate jurisdiction the federal courts are not to employ independent judgment on the merits of legal issues and mixed questions of law and
fact, but must, instead, give effect to previous judgments reached
in state court. I have to say, however, that any attempt to read
§ 2254(d) this way faces monumental hurdles.
Once again, § 2254(d) is plainly premised on the common understanding that a habeas corpus petition initiates an original,
quasi-civil action in federal court. Nothing in this new provision
purports to repeal or affect in any way the basic habeas jurisdiction, established by § 2241 and § 2254(a). In the exercise of the
power conferred by those statutes, a federal habeas court clearly
must take serious account of a previous state judgment. But the
federal court does not assume a hierarchal power routinely to superintend the work of the state courts as though they were inferior
tribunals within the federal system. 1
Nor is there any explicit language in § 2254(d) purporting to
establish a new appellate jurisdiction in the federal district courts.
And small wonder. In two hundred years of American constitutional history, Congress has never once thought it necessary or appropriate that the inferior federal courts should sit in judgment of
their state counterparts. Scarcely any aspect of federal courts jurisprudence is more well settled and familiar than the proposition
that the district '92courts' jurisdiction is, and has always been,
"strictly original.

A departure from this pivotal principle would

90. Id. Senator Hatch read almost precisely this same speech, mentioning Harlow in
the same way, when he later defended the habeas bill after it returned to the Senate from
conference. 142 CONG. REc. S3446 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch),
91. See supra text following note 75.
92. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).
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have implications for federal-state relations on a fantastic scale.
For the essentials of the American judicial system are anchored in
it: the bedrock understanding that "we have. . .in this country two
essentially separate legal systems;"93 the equally basic understanding that the federal and state courts proceed "independently" with
"ultimate review" of their judgments in the Supreme Court
alone; 4 and the corollary understanding that the state courts are
under no obligation to follow inferior federal court decisions as
though they were authoritative.9 5 One can only imagine the passions that would have been stirred if anyone had thought for a moment that this obscure provision would, for the first time, subject
the state courts to the direct appellate supervision of federal trial-

level courts.9 6

Subjecting state supreme court judgments to appellate review
in the federal district courts would not only constitute a startling
deviation from custom. It would raise the most serious constitutional questions. To be sure, Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No.
82 supports congressional power to confer such a jurisdiction. But
the Supreme Court has never had occasion to address the argu93. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Bd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970).
94. Id.
95. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 505 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring). See generally, Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983
(1971) (citing other precedents).
96. If anyone was thinking in these terms, then certainly previous proposals to establish
such an appellate jurisdiction (at the circuit level) would have been recalled and considered.
E.g., Daniel J. Meador, StraighteningOut FederalReview of State Criminal Cases, 44 OHIO
ST. L.J. 273 (1983); James Duke Cameron, Federal Review, Finality of State Court Decisions, and a Proposal for a National Court of Appeals-A State Judge's Solution to a
ContinuingProblem, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 545. Nowhere in the materials touching § 2254(d)
were those proposals so much as mentioned.
It is true that some participants in the floor debates referred to § 2254(d) as establishing a "standard of review." It may well be that in using that phrase they thought they were
discussing federal court "review" of state judgments in the ordinary, appellate sense. Yet it
is hardly necessary to infer from the misstatements or misconceptions of individual members that the product Congress ultimately produced worked such a fundamental restructuring of federal-state relations. Rather, I think those references on the floor to federal "review" are consistent with the understanding of § 2254(d) that I am defending-which has it
that this new provision focuses federal habeas adjudication on any prior adjudication of the
merits that has occurred in state court.
This, by the way, is what the Supreme Court probably meant in Wright v. West, 505
U.S. 277 (1992), when the Court referred to a federal habeas court's responsibility to "review [a] state court's determination" of the merits of a claim "de novo." It is also what the
President must have meant in his signing statement. Signing Statement, supra note 27 (referring to "death row appeals" and "independent review of federal legal claims" but disclaiming the view that § 2254(d) limits "the authority of the Federal courts to bring their
own independent judgment to bear on questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact
that come before them on habeas corpus") (emphasis added).
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ments arrayed against Hamilton's view. Those arguments are powerful. Article III refers explicitly to appellate jurisdiction only with
respect to the "one" Supreme Court whose creation is constitutionally mandated. That one Supreme Court, in turn, is widely understood to have been given appellate jurisdiction over state court
judgments by virtue of the "Madisonian Compromise," pursuant to
which anti-federalists withdrew their opposition to such a jurisdiction in exchange for a commitment to leave the creation of inferior
federal courts to the new Congress. 97 Even then, the Supreme
Court's power to review state judgments for error remained controversial and was finally settled only after protracted litigation.9
Against this background, it would be no small matter for Congress
to attempt to subject state decisions to review in the inferior federal courts and thus to reopen an old (and vexing) question of federal judicial power. 9
If it is difficult to justify granting the district courts jurisdiction to review state court judgments, it is ever so much more difficult to justify granting them such a jurisdiction, but then withholding from them the authority to determine claims according to
their own, independent judgment. Indeed, if that is what § 2254(d)
means, then this new statute may well be invalid. For Congress
cannot constitutionally condition the decision that an Article III
court can reach with respect to a legal question (and certainly a
question of constitutional law), or a mixed question of law and
fact, without invading the independence of the judicial branch. "It
is," after all, "the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is."' 0 0
Congress has considerable power to fix the federal courts' jurisdiction in the first instance. 01' And Congress can affect the results in cases by changing the law the federal courts are to apply.10 2
97. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND
mE. SYsTEm 10-11 (3d ed. 1988).

WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED-

98. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
99. The establishment of appellate jurisdiction in the district courts would also revive
the constitutional arguments raised against the creation of a national court of appeals to
relieve the Supreme Court of part of its appellate work. E.g., Charles Black, The National
Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 YALE L.J. 883 (1974). District court judgments
would presumably themselves be subject to appellate review and thus would not purport to

resolve federal questions for the entire country. Yet situating the inferior federal courts
between the state courts and the Supreme Court would obviously affect the latter's appel-

late functions in ways that would be constitutionally significant.
100. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see Signing Statement,
supra note 27 (making this point).
101. See Sheldin v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
102. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992). Accord United
States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 431 (1980)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Gray
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But Congress cannot confer jurisdiction on an Article III court,
leave the substantive law unchanged, and still presume to tell the
court what judgment to render on the merits.1 01 No one has seriously endorsed any such congressional overreaching for generations, and certainly not since Professor Henry Hart's classic statement on the point.10 4 Only last Term, the Supreme Court

reiterated that Congress has no power to assign "rubber-stamp
105
work" to an Article III court.
If, indeed, this is the kind of appellate jurisdiction § 2254(d)
means to establish, it doubly disrupts the settled federal order of
things. For it neither accords to the state courts the respect that is
their due, nor assigns to the federal district courts the full judicial
power they are given Article III authority to exercise. Each, instead, gets half a loaf.
On the one hand, a state court is denied the authority to operate as a court in the ordinary course-authoritative with respect to
local law, able to determine questions of federal law, but, as to the
latter, necessarily subject to appellate review de novo. The state
court is not entitled to be judged straightforwardly on whether it
has arrived at a correct judgment on a federal constitutional question. Rather, it is subject to a shadow set of standards and may
v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1993).
103. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). Cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1455 (1995) (reaffirming Hamilton's admonition in Federalist No. 78
that "[t]he interpretation of the laws" is "the proper and peculiar province of the courts").
104. Said Hart:
It's hard, for me at least, to read into Article HI any guarantee to a civil litigant of
a hearing in a federal constitutional court (outside the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court), if Congress chooses to provide some alternative procedure....
On the other hand, if Congress directs an Article III court to decide a case, I
can easily read into Article DI a limitation on the power of Congress to tell the
court how to decide it. . . .That's the reason, isn't it, why [Chief Justice] Hughes
invokes Article III as well as the Fifth Amendment in Crowell v. Benson? As he
says, the case was one "where the question concerns the proper exercise of the
judicial power in enforcing constitutional limitations."
BATOR, supra note 97, at 400.
105. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. 2227, 2234 (1995): "Congress may be
free to establish a... scheme that operates without court participation .... But that is a
matter quite different from instructing a court automatically to enter a judgment pursuant
to a decision the court has no authority to evaluate."
In Gutierrez, the Court was concerned with a statutory framework in which an initial
decision was assigned to a federal executive officer. Yet there is no reason to think that the
same constitutional difficulty would not attend an attempt to assign a preliminary decision
to a state court and then to call on a federal court to "rubber-stamp" that decision, without
an independent evaluation. Here, moreover, as in Gutierrez, the constitutional violation
would be exacerbated in that § 2254(d), like the statute in Gutierrez, makes no explicit
provision even for a federal examination of the process by which the state court reached the
outcome it did.
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find its decisions upset (in effect) for being unacceptably
wrong-as determined by a federal district court. One suspects
that most state courts would rather be told they have made an
incorrect decision than that their failings have been indulged by a
federal court prepared to act only if they commit egregious error.
A federal court, on the other hand, is also denied the ability to
proceed in the ordinary, traditional way-deciding whether the
federal claims that come before it are meritorious and awarding
relief when it is called for. Instead, a federal district court that is
convinced that a prisoner is in custody in violation of the Constitution can act only finds if it first decides (presumptuously) that a
state court that previously adjudicated a claim shot so wide of the
mark that its judgment must be considered unreasonable. This is
not a role that Article III contemplates for any federal court.106

IV. THE CONVENTIONAL HABEAS MODEL
The problems raised by the official immunity and appellate review models are insurmountable. Those interpretations of
§ 2254(d) cannot be reconciled with other provisions in Chapter
153, either the provisions that were there previously or the new
provisions added by Pub. L. 104-132. Nor can they be reconciled
with the larger body of federal courts law within which § 2254(d)
must function. If either of those models were accepted, then this
single obscure new provision in the habeas corpus statutes would
require massive reformulations of well settled arrangements in adjacent fields. This being so, it only makes sense to ask whether
there is a more modest, more sensible, construction to be placed on
§ 2254(d). There is such a construction; it fairly stares out at us
from the page.
The language, context, and history of § 2254(d) bring it comfortably within the conventional habeas corpus framework. Habeas
is an extraordinary remedy and is not to be used routinely to "relitigate state trials."'1 0 7 Since a federal habeas court has no appellate
jurisdiction to superintend the state courts directly, it follows that
a federal district court is in no position to reverse a state court
106. At the very least, then, Article I questions can and should be avoided by interpreting § 2254(d) to leave the federal judiciary free to exercise independent judgment on
federal questions. For "it is a cardinal principle" that if it is "fairly possible" to construe a

statute affecting federal court jurisdiction to avoid a constitutional question, then the statute should be interpreted in that way. Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974). Cf.
United States v. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. 464, 470 (1994) (confirming that courts will
not "impute to Congress an attempt to pass legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution as construed by [the Supreme Court]").

107. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983).

412

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

judgment it finds erroneous. By contrast, a federal court is dutybound to accord a prior state court judgment all due attention and
respect.
The difficulty the proponents of § 2254(d) perceived in the
modern habeas system is that the peculiar "de novo" standard for
federal habeas adjudication, usually associated with Brown v. Allen,108 had developed into something quite different from the ordinary "de novo" standard as it exists in appellate review cases. In
the context of appellate review, "de novo" review is understood to
mean that an appellate court will focus its attention on the action
taken below and then exercise independent judgment on whether
that action was correct. 10 9 In the habeas corpus context, by contrast, the "de novo" standard had taken on a different meaning:
that a federal court could and should ignore a previous state court
judgment on the merits-as though it didn't exist.
In the minds of the critics pressing for change, that state of
affairs misapprehended the implications of the baseline premise
that the federal courts have no appellate jurisdiction over state
court judgments. The absence of appellate jurisdiction implies that
a federal court should accord a state judgment all due respect and
should be properly convinced that a prisoner's claim is meritorious
before rejecting a state court's judgment as a sufficient basis for
the prisoner's custody. Yet the "de novo" standard that had developed in habeas drew virtually the opposite inference. The absence
of a federal appellate jurisdiction to oversee the state courts allowed, or even required, a federal habeas court to ignore a prior
state court judgment entirely.
In fact, of course, even habeas proponents would acknowledge
that a prior state court adjudication represents the best available
judicial thinking about the very question before the federal court.
That would be true if the federal district court were reviewing the
state decision in an appellate fashion; it is equally true when a federal district court operates within the habeas corpus model. This
new provision in Pub. L. 104-132, accordingly, insists that a federal
court entertaining a claim that was previously adjudicated in state
court must take that prior adjudication as a starting point-just as
would the district court if it were reviewing the state court's work
on appeal or, if you like, just as would the Supreme Court if it
were reviewing the state decision on certiorari. Still, the federal
habeas court must itself exercise independent judgment. Yet the
focus of that independent federal judgment is not the merits of the
108. 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).
109. See First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (1995).
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claim in the air, but rather the accuracy of the prior state court
decision on the merits.
This difference is one of focus, to be sure, but it is an important difference of focus that delineates the federal court's function.
In constitutional adjudication, as in life generally, it makes a good
deal of practical difference whether a decision-maker shoulders initial responsibility for addressing and resolving a question or, instead, limits his judgment to whether a previous decision-maker
reached the correct result. It is that psychological effect that
§ 2254(d) attempts to achieve.11 0
Let me underscore that by directing the federal habeas courts
to address state decisions explicitly, § 2254(d) does not transmute
habeas into an ordinary appellate jurisdiction. I have just sketched
the reasons why that interpretation will not do. This new provision
only borrows from the appellate model one crucial feature-the
"de novo" standard as it is customarily understood: i.e., independent judgment on the accuracy of a previous decision on the merits. By assimilating this orthodox meaning for "de novo" adjudication into habeas, § 2254(d) embraces the aspect of the appellate
model that most respects the integrity and competence of the state
courts-and concomitantly rejects other hierarchical baggage that
attends the appellate model in its own field.
Under this new statute, as in the past, state court judgments
are subject to direct review (and possible reversal) only by the Supreme Court itself. Under this new statute, as in the past, state
courts are compelled to accept as authoritative only the Supreme
Court's own elaboration of federal law (not the decisions of inferior
federal tribunals). Under this new statute, as in the past, both federal and state courts exercise independent judgment on the merits
of federal claims. Under this new statute, however, a federal
habeas court focuses its independent consideration of the merits in
a distinct fashion: by asking whether a previous state court judgment was erroneous.
110. There is a functional analogy between the framework that § 2254(d) establishes
for a federal habeas court examining legal claims previously adjudicated by a state court
and the framework that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) establishes for a federal district court examining matters previously determined by a magistrate judge. The district court need not hear
anew the evidence that was before the magistrate and, in that way, relitigate what the magistrate has already adjudicated. But the district court is certainly charged to make its own
"de novo determination" regarding the findings and recommendations reached and offered
by the magistrate judge. Otherwise, the scheme by which magistrate judges conduct suppression hearings would almost certainly be unconstitutional. See United States v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 674 (1980).
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A. Section 2254(d) and Teague v. Lane
If § 2254(d) is to function within the existing habeas environment, this new statute must attend to the Supreme Court's decision in Teague v. Lane and related cases. The groundwork here is
familiar. In cases arising on direct review, the Supreme Court held
in Griffith v. Kentucky,"" that it is constitutionally essential to invoke the principles of federal law that prevail at the time of appellate decision. This is true even if the Court chooses a particular
case as the occasion for announcing a "new" rule of constitutional
law. When that happens, the "new" rule is fully applicable to the
case at bar, as well as to any other case that has not yet reached
final disposition on direct review. In cases arising on writ of habeas
corpus, by contrast, the Court held in Teague that the Habeas
Corpus Act (as it then existed) should be read to bar the announcement or enforcement of a "new" rule, except in exceptional
circumstances." 2
Subsequently, all the action in the Teague doctrine has arisen
with respect to the definition of what counts as a "new" rule. In
that regard, the Court has said two things of primary significance
here. First, a federal habeas court is typically barred from applying
an innovative legal standard established by a precedent handed
down after a prisoner's case left state court. A legal standard is
sufficiently "new" for these purposes if previous precedents cannot
fairly be cited in support of it and the rule, accordingly, depends
on the more recent decision."' Second, a federal habeas court is
also typically barred from applying a settled legal standard in a
"4novel setting," so that the reasoning undergirding the rule is "extended.' 14 If,accordingly, a state court entertaining a prisoner's
claim would not have felt "compelled" by then-existing precedents
court cannot do
to find his claim meritorious, then a federal habeas
5
so without establishing a "new" rule of law."
The first of these propositions is comparatively modest and
has raised few concerns, even in the circles in which I move. The
111. 479 U.S. 314 (1979).
112. Those exceptional circumstances were two: (1) where a "new" rule placed "certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe;" and (2) where the "new" rule inaugurated "new procedures without
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction [would be] seriously diminished." Teague,
489 U.S. at 311, 313.
113. E.g., Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
114. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992). E.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461
(1993); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990).

115. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488.
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second has evoked genuine alarm in the academic community.11 It
is that proposition on which Justice Thomas bases his argument
that the federal courts may routinely defer to "reasonable" state
court judgments on "mixed" questions of law and fact.11 7 Justice
Thomas acknowledges that his position has nothing to do with
keeping the federal habeas courts from surprising the state courts
by invoking rules of law that are genuinely "new." He insists, however, that the Court's definition of "new" rules in this context effectively revisits the older question whether a federal habeas court
can and should exercise independent judgment on the merits of a
federal claim. Of course, it is because its definition of "new" rules
lends itself to that very enterprise that the Teague doctrine has
come under sharp attack.1 18
There is no denying that § 2254(d) captures something like
the descriptions of "new" rules that appear in the Teague cases.
The statute generally disallows federal habeas relief when a prior
state court judgment is in place, but it suspends that prohibition
in two instances: when the previous state judgment was either
"contrary to. . .clearly established Federal law" or "involved an
unreasonable application of" clearly established law. Certainly the
reference to "clearly established" federal law implies that federal
habeas is not typically to be a vehicle for advancing the development of federal rights. Some observers may well read the new statute simply to codify the Teague doctrine; some, I dare say, will
read it to endorse Justice Thomas' twist on Teague.
The ostensible similarities between Teague and § 2254(d) being conceded, however, the only thing that follows for sure is that
the two cannot function in tandem. This is to say, the new statute
cannot take the Teague doctrine as it finds it and simply establish
other questions for a federal court to answer after the court is satisfied that Teague, for its part, allows the court to award relief.
116. See Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner'sDilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts
After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV. 371 (1991); Susan Bandes, Taking Justice to Its
Logical Extreme: A Comment on Teague v. Lane, 66 So. CALIF. L. REV. 2453 (1993); Vivian
Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied-A Comment on Recent Proposals to Reform
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1665 (1990); Barry Friedman, Habeas
and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REv. 797 (1992); James S. Liebman, More Than "Slightly Retro:"
The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdictionin Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U.
Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537 (1990-91). See also Yackle, supra note 73 at 2385-99.
117. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992).
118. See Yackle, supra note 73. On the wider (and widely unfortunate) jurisprudential
implications, see Markus Dirk Dubber, Prudenceand Substance: How the Supreme Court's
New Habeas Retroactivity Doctrine Mirrors and Affects Substantive ConstitutionalLaw,
30 AM. CRim. L. REv. 1 (1992); Richard Fallon & Daniel Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1731 (1991).
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The questions that Teague and the statute contemplate overlap
too much to make any such seriatim analysis a sensible exercise.
The different question whether the statute codifies the Teague

doctrine is more difficult. On examination, the answer must be
negative. The fact is that § 2254(d) does not incorporate the Supreme Court's Teague doctrine in so many words, despite available
illustrations of how that might be done. 119 Moreover, § 2254(d)
does not mention the exceptions the Court has recognized to
Teague's general prohibition on the enforcement of "new" rules in

habeas. 120 It just won't do, then, to read this statute simply to incorporate Teague and its progeny, such that the statutory language
can be ignored and future cases can be handled as further elaborations of judge-made decisional law.1 21 It is accurate only to say that

119. E.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948, 953 (1994).
120. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989).
121. Statutes do occasionally embrace a body of case law wholesale. Congress, after all,
codified the "exhaustion doctrine" nearly fifty years ago. In that instance, however, an accompanying committee report was clear on the point: "This section is declaratory of existing
law as affirmed by the Supreme Court." H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. AlS0
(1947). Here, there is no such statement in any authoritative legislative source to the effect
that § 2254(d) equally codifies Teague.
Other provisions in Pub. L. 104-132 put one in mind of the Teague exceptions. For
example, § 2244(b)(2)(A)(as amended) allows a prisoner to excuse a failure to raise a claim
in a prior federal petition in part on the ground that the claim depends on a "new" rule that
was "previously unavailable" but has been made "retroactive to cases on collateral review."
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C), as amended (employing a similar test with respect to
filing deadlines); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i), as amended (using the same test with respect
to the development of facts in prior state proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as amended (incorporating the same standard with respect to the filing deadlines for § 2255 motions and
also with respect to the acceptability of second or successive § 2255 motions); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2264 (employing the same test with respect to the acceptability of claims that were not
raised and decided on the merits in state court).
On first blush, one might take those references as evidence that § 2254(d) codifies
Teague bag and baggage-so that it is necessary to acknowledge that a prisoner who fits one
of Teague's exceptions is exempted from the general prohibition on the application of
"new" rules. But if § 2254(d) embraces Teague complete with its exceptions, I would expect
the exceptions to be mentioned in § 2254(d) itself-so that it is clear that the exceptions
are available to a prisoner filing her first federal petition, irrespective of whether she has
met the filing deadline or developed the claim and its supporting facts in state court.
By placing these references to "new," but "retroactive," rules in the sections where they
appear, Pub. L. 104-132 suggests something entirely different. Those references are not to
"new" rules that are available in habeas because of Teague's exceptions, but rather to
"new" rules that are available to any litigant simply because the Supreme Court has announced them. It is significant, I think, that all the extra-§ 2254(d) references to "new"
rules in Pub. L. 104-132 are limited to rules the Supreme Court itself has made retroactively
applicable. Under the Teague doctrine, the lower federal courts, too, participate in the making of "new" and retroactively applicable law-so long as the innovations they establish fit
into one of the exceptions. The Supreme Court itself must be involved only if "new" rules
are established outside the Teague exceptions. Cf. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)
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Congress has legislated in the field in which Teague has operated
and has thus reformulated the way in which the federal habeas
courts are to deal with the question that Teague previously answered-that is, the effect of a prior state court judgment on the
merits.
Think of it this way. Viewing the habeas statutes as they were
prior to Pub. L. 104-132, the Supreme Court understood that the
(holding that when the Supreme Court announces a novel principle on direct review the
principle is applicable retrospectively to all litigants still in the appellate pipeline).
This reading, too, faces a textual difficulty. All but one of the extra-§ 2254(d) references to "new" rules contemplate that the Supreme Court has made such a "new" rule
retroactively applicable "to cases on collateral review." E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), as
amended. Under the Griffith/Teague regime, the Court (any court) would have occasion to
decide that a "new" rule is applicable to "collateral review" cases only in a case that is itself
in the collateral posture-i.e., only in a habeas action in which the question is whether the
"new" rule fits within one of Teague's exceptions. By dint of Griffith, the question of retroactive applicability would not even arise in a case on direct review of a state court judgment:
anything the Court might say in that posture would automatically have retrospective effect,
albeit only to cases still subject to direct appellate review. There is, then, a fair argument
that these extra-§ 2254(d) references to "new" rules do somehow reflect Teague's
exceptions.
At the very most, however, this last argument proves only that Pub. L. 104-132 is ambiguous in this respect (as it is in so many others). References to the Supreme Court point
in one direction, while references to rules made applicable "to cases on collateral review"
point in the other. The competing interpretations, however, are scarcely weighted equally.
Any argument that § 2254(d) simply codifies Teague faces all the other difficulties I have
sketched in the text. Moreover, at least one extra-§ 2254(d) reference to "new" rules in Pub.
L. 104-132, § 2264, has it that the Supreme Court may simply recognize "a new Federal
right that is made retroactively applicable"-period. That provision, for one, does not appear to contemplate Teague's exceptions, but, instead, is perfectly, and textually, consistent
with the understanding that a federal habeas court can now give effect to a "new" rule of
law, announced by the Supreme Court in any setting and at any time.
When, accordingly, the sections of Pub. L. 104-132 on successive petitions, filing deadlines, fact-finding, § 2255 motions, and procedural default refer to "new" rules of law, I
conclude they mean the ordinary evolution of constitutional law in the Supreme Court. By
this account, two things are true. First, the Teague doctrine has been superseded; Griffith is
no longer restricted to the direct review context. Second, § 2254(d) now occupies this field
of play and controls the effect of prior state court judgments in federal habeas; that effect
no longer turns on whether the prisoner's claim depends on a "new" rule of constitutional
law.
I have found nothing in the legislative history that throws serious light on the relationship between § 2254(d) and Teague. I do think, however, that Senator Hatch's introduction
of the bill to his colleagues is consistent with the view I am defending:
There will be a full right of appeal all the way up the State courts, from the lowest
court to the Supreme Court of the State. There will be a full right of appeal all
the way up the Federal courts, from the Federal. . .district court to the Supreme
Court of the United States .... But that is all [prisoners] are going to have, unless they can show newly discovered evidence of innocence or unless the Supreme
Court applies retroactively future cases to these problems.
141 CONG. REc. S7481 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added).
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point of federal habeas corpus was to deter the state courts from
disregarding controlling principles of federal law. Under the habeas
statutes as they then stood, years could pass between state and
federal adjudications of a prisoner's case. During that time, federal
law could change-in the prisoner's favor. Yet in the Court's view
the deterrent purpose of habeas was not served by granting federal
relief on the basis of a "new" rule of federal law, which, by hypothesis, the state court reasonably failed to recognize at the time it
acted. In Teague v. Lane, accordingly, the Court held that, except
in rare circumstances, the federal courts should decline to enforce
"new" rules in habeas. That way, the federal courts could respect
state attempts to comply with federal law established at the time
of state court decision, and the federal courts would not surprise
the states by awarding relief on the basis of an interpretation of
the Constitution that had not prevailed earlier.
Pub. L. 104-132 acknowledges the problems that were the focus of Teague, but responds in an entirely different way. Rather
than adjusting the federal courts' attitude toward prior state court
judgments as a means to account for delays between state and federal adjudication, this new statute takes the direct route. Pub. L.
104-132 expedites the habeas process, thus reducing delays and,
into the bargain, redressing any difficulties that flow from the
evolution of federal law over time. By ensuring that federal habeas
comes promptly on the heels of state adjudication, Pub. L. 104-132
changes the statutory foundation on which Teague was premised.
This new statute necessarily uproots judicially-crafted doctrines
developed to respond to concerns about habeas that had emerged
since Congress last legislated in this field nearly thirty years ago.
This is true for the rules governing second and successive petitions. 122 It is also true for the rules governing the effect of prior
state court judgments on the merits."2 '
Congress has now reentered the habeas field, and the result is
vitally important: The sharp line the Court formerly drew in Griffith and Teague between claims raised on direct review and claims
raised in habeas is no more. The availability of federal habeas jurisdiction no longer turns on a strained attempt to decide whether
a claim depends on "new" law, and the federal habeas courts are
concomitantly relieved of the artificial search for "new" rules that
122. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.

123. The Teague doctrine was necessarily a construction of the habeas statutes as they
were prior to Pub. L. 104-132. Congress was always able to legislate the effect the federal
habeas courts should give to prior state judgments and thus to supplant the Court's attempts to resolve that problem. Justice White actually invited Congress to do this when
Teague was first decided. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 317 (1989) (White, J., concurring).
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previously absorbed their time and temper. Under the new statute,
by contrast, the federal courts will address prior state adjudicathe state courts reached the cortions forthrightly, decide whether
12 4
rect result, and act accordingly.
B.

Teague's Remnants

None of this is to say that the demise of the Teague doctrine
proper eliminates Teague's influence entirely. Quite the contrary.
The Teague doctrine occupied the ground that § 2254(d) now
holds, and it only makes sense that some of the features of that
doctrine can be helpful in developing the new regime envisioned by
the statute. Chiefly, Teague's continuing influence will be felt with
respect to the conditions that § 2254(d) fixes for its own application. Sometimes, the new statute operates as did Teague; sometimes not. To work through the intricacies, we can only turn to the
statute's language and read it against the background of preexisting practice-including practice under Teague.
The preamble to § 2254(d) establishes a general rule that a
federal habeas court shall not grant relief "with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State proceedings
. . .. " In this, the new statute recognizes three prerequisites to its
application in any case. First, the existence of a qualifying state
124. I see no warrant in § 2254(d) for reviving the old "retroactivity" doctrine the
Court rejected for direct review cases in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1979), and for
habeas cases in Teague. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See Yackle,
supra note 73, at 2381-86. We are probably well rid of that. However, there are even more
obvious deficiencies in the Teague doctrine. The attempt in Teague to withdraw habeas
corpus from the wider body of case law on "retroactivity" was an intellectual failure. The
new statute puts an end to that experiment and allows claims raised in habeas to be governed by the principles the Court follows in other instances in which the law is thought to
develop underfoot. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993); James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991); Griffith, 479 U.S. 314.
I do see warrant in § 2254(d) for reviving cases like Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984), in
which the Court accepted the novelty of a prisoner's legal claim as "cause" for his failure to
raise it previously in state court. When the Teague doctrine barred "new rule" claims from
habeas entirely (whether pressed on the state courts or not), Reed fell by the wayside. Now
that § 2254(d) refuses to treat the novelty of a claim as a complete justification for denying
habeas relief, Reed should come alive again. Under the new law, novelty is no longer a bar to
federal habeas relief and may well be a justification for procedural default in state court.
This, of course, is the same point I made previously about the provisions in Pub. L. 104-132
that expressly excuse prisoners who were not in a position to meet filing deadlines, to develop facts, or to include a claim in a prior federal petition-because the claim rests on a
"new" rule that the Supreme Court has itself made retroactive. See note 121 supra. It may
have been dissatisfaction with Reed that later produced Teague. See Reed, 368 U.S. at 26
n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Now, dissatisfaction with Teague promises to resuscitate
Reed.
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court decision is a defense to a petitioner's claim for relief in federal court. Second, any such claim must have been "adjudicated"
previously in state court. Third, that state "adjudication" must
have been "on the merits."
As to the first condition, it seems sensible to engage the same
rule that governed the applicability of the Teague doctrine prior to
Pub. L. 104-132. If the existence of a previous state court judgment
can be a defense to an application for federal relief, then § 2254(d)
should be triggered in a particular case in the way that the Teague
doctrine was triggered-when it is properly and seasonably raised
by the party seeking its benefits, i.e., the respondent in a federal
habeas action. 2 6
When Teague was inapplicable to a habeas case, the federal
court reached the merits in the ordinary course. 128 Since this new

provision displaces Teague, it seems sensible to conclude that
when it proves inapplicable in a particular instance, the federal
court equally will turn to the merits. This is to say, the default
position is independent merits adjudication in federal court, without direct reference to a previous state court adjudication and
without any reference at all to the previous arrangements for
habeas devised by the Court in Teague.
As to the second and third conditions for the application of
§ 2254(d), the Teague doctrine offers less help-for the obvious
reason that Teague did not depend on the existence of a prior
state judgment. This new statute, however, demands not only a
previous state 1court
"adjudication," but a previous adjudication
27
"on the merits.

1

Initially, it appears that an "adjudication" must

125. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1990). See Goeke v. Branch, 115 S. Ct.
1275 (1995)(concluding that the state had sufficiently preserved the issue); Schiro v. Farley,
114 S. Ct. 783 (1994) (indicating that a belated Teague argument might be heard as a means
of defending a lower court judgment on alternative grounds). Of course, the respondent's
burden differs from what it was under Teague, which called on the respondent to argue that
the prisoner's claim depended on a "new rule" of law. Under Teague, there was no obliga-

tion to refer to a prior state court judgment on the claim. Under § 2254(d), the respondent
must plead and prove the existence of such a state judgment.
126. E.g., Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994).
127. The reference to federal relief "with respect to" a claim is ambiguous. Yet it seems

inescapable that this provision must be limited to cases in which a state court previously
rejected a prisoner's claim on the merits. If read in any other way, this language would make

little sense. Consider, for example, a case in which the state and federal courts agree that a
claim is meritorious, but disagree over whether the error was harmless. No one would seriously contend that this provision bars relief-because any relief at all would have to be
"with respect to" the underlying claim. Both Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993),
and O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995), assume there will be cases in which federal

habeas relief is available when the state courts misjudge the effect of trial error. Unless
§ 2254(d) overrules those recent cases sub silentio, a federal court must have authority to
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be more than a decision. After all, in its preamble, together with its
very next paragraph, § 2254(d) refers to an "adjudication... that
resulted in a decision." It follows that these two are not identical
events; by contrast, the one is a consequence of the other. An "adjudication" is not12a8 result (a disposition), but a process by which a
result is reached.
The requirement that the adjudication must have been "on
the merits" seems plainly to specify the object of the state court
"adjudication" that must have occurred. It is not enough that the
state court considered something; it is essential that the state court
"adjudicated" the "merits" of a particular claim-i.e., the bona
fides of that claim.12 9 There is a sense, too, in which "adjudication"
on "the merits" touches the state court's result. 30
act in this hypothetical.
128. What kind of process? Surely a process sufficient to develop the material facts and
to marshal the relevant legal arguments for judicial judgment. In a case in which the facts
are in dispute, an "adjudication" requires state fact-finding procedures necessary to sort
truth from falsehood: competent counsel, essential support services (investigators, experts,
etc.), discovery-the usual tools by which adversaries delineate disputes of fact for resolution. Typically, an evidentiary hearing will be necessary-at which opposing counsel can
present evidence, interrogate witnesses, and offer arguments. In all cases, of course, there
must be an opportunity for the parties to brief and argue the issues.
What kinds of state court decisions should not be considered to have been reached via
"adjudication"? I should think decisions based on judgments made by others (e.g., court
staff); decisions that merely rubberstamp proposed findings or orders prepared by the state;
decisions rendered before factual issues and legal arguments are considered; and decisions
that reflect a fundamental misapprehension of the issues-thus indicating that the state
court has not committed the necessary time and effort to the matter at hand. In this connection, the procedural standards listed in the previous version of § 2254(d) may be useful
by analogy. Cases in which federal courts found state process wanting under those standards
may provide illustrations of the kinds of state court behavior that should not count as "adjudication" under the new statute.
129. A judgment "on the merits" cannot include any disposition short of a decision that
a claim lacks the factual or legal support necessary to obtain relief-ceteris paribus. A decision that a claim was procedurally barred, or a summary dismissal unaccompanied by an
explanation anchored in the merits of a particular claim, simply cannot answer here. Similarly, the "merits" were not determined if the state court refused to consider a claim on the
ground that it depended on a "new" rule of law. Cf. Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 788-89
(1994) (distinguishing the validity of a Teague defense from the "merits" of a prisoner's
underlying claim). To ensure that the state court considered the substantive power of a
claim and found it wanting, the respondent should be asked to produce some written statement from the state court to that effect.
130. The prerequisites for "merits" adjudication may be informed by the decisions on a
prisoner's obligation to exhaust state remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. That
obligation to exhaust is perpetuated by a separate provision in Pub. L. 104-132. See notes
11-16 and accompanying text supra. A prisoner can satisfy the exhaustion doctrine only by
alerting the state courts to the nature of the claim so that they can comprehend its federal
character. Duncan v. Henry, 115 S. Ct. 887 (1995). Likewise, a state court "adjudication"
should not be considered to have been "on the merits," if the state court failed clearly to
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IN CONTEXT

If we posit that what I have said thus far is accurate, if we
accept that Pub. L. 104-132 deals with delays and shifting legal
standards by expediting the habeas process, and if we take it that
Teague has been eclipsed in the main, it remains still to place a
sensible construction on the language in § 2254(d). I mean to argue that notwithstanding the loose talk in the floor debates,
§ 2254(d) authorizes the federal habeas courts to award relief if
they conclude that the state courts previously misjudged federal
claims-and does not call upon the federal courts to "defer" to
"reasonable" state court decisions on the meaning of the United
States Constitution. 131
The language in § 2254(d) reflects a compromise solution to a
controversy that had gripped the executive and legislative
13 2
branches of the national government for more than fifty years.
recognize its federal nature and to pass on it as a federal matter. These two provisions in
Pub. L. 104-132 complement each other: both anticipate that the state courts will give federal claims focused attention before federal habeas relief is sought.
The precedents on the effect of procedural default in state court equally fit this same
model. Federal habeas corpus is barred if the prisoner failed to raise her federal claim in
state court at the time and in the manner prescribed by state law, if the state courts (for
that reason) refused to consider the claim on the merits, and if the resulting procedural
ground of decision would preclude direct review in the Supreme Court under the "adequate
and independent" state ground doctrine. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). If,
however, the state court overlooked the prisoner's default and reached the merits anyway,
federal habeas is available. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989). In order to determine
whether the state court did, indeed, pass on the merits, the federal court must decide
whether that court's decision "fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law." Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. at 736 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983)). Section
2254(d) asks the federal court to undertake a similar task.
In effect, § 2254(d) reverses the interests of the state in the basis of a prior state judgment. In default cases, the respondent typically seeks to establish that the state judgment
was not on the merits and thus to foreclose federal adjudication on procedural grounds.
Here, the respondent may wish to prove that the state court reached the merits. In the
default cases, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing an adjudication on the merits.
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991). Here, I have argued that the respondent bears
that burden.
131. Of course, the justices who now control the Court have made it clear that, notwithstanding Justice Thomas' view of the matter, Teague, too, was consistent with the independent adjudication principle established in Brown. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 305
(1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As Justice O'Connor
has said, a state court's judgment on the merits of a constitutional claim has never been
allowed to stand "because it was reasonable." Id. at 305.
132. I have traced the congressional debates over habeas in greater detail elsewhere.
Yackle, supra note 73. Here, I lay aside other currents in the larger tide, particularly failed
attempts by congressional liberals to overrule restrictive Supreme Court decisions, and focus
entirely on the single-minded efforts of conservatives to enact statutory limits on federal
habeas practice.
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Allowing for some backing and filling, the pattern that controversy
followed is quite clear. Proponents of curbs on habeas corpus initially sought to eliminate the federal courts' authority to award relief on the basis of claims previously rejected in state court-either
by repealing the federal courts' jurisdiction outright or by giving
prior state judgments preclusive effect. When those efforts failed in
the face of intense opposition, proponents made concessions in
three stages-each, in turn, offering additional assurance that the
federal courts would not be denied power to grant relief with respect to meritorious claims.
First, proponents of restrictive legislation produced statements assuring members of Congress that, under their program,
the federal courts would retain the ability to award habeas relief-if the state courts reached decisions that could not be said to
be "reasonable." Second, when many members expressed concern
that background documents might not temper the explicit terms of
a new statute, proponents agreed to incorporate their statements
about deference to "reasonable" state decisions into the text of
their bill. Third, when critical members still were not convinced,
proponents adjusted their proposal yet again, this time eliminating
the requirement that federal courts must defer to "reasonable"
state judgments, and, instead, making it clear that federal relief
would be available if prisoners demonstrate they are in custody on
the basis of erroneous state court judgments on the merits. It was
this last change in the language of the bill earlier this year that
finally won acceptance and now, as a result, has become law.
A. Initial Assaults
In the mid-1940s, a special committee of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, chaired by Judge John J. Parker,
drafted several habeas initiatives, one of which would have eliminated the federal courts' jurisdiction to grant relief with respect to
I do not propose to harvest the meaning of the provisions of Pub. L. 104-132 from the
floor debates alone. I do think, though, that those debates constitute legitimate grist for the
interpretive grinder and that, given their due, they endorse an understanding of the bills
that is also (and independently) grounded in their text and other features on the habeas
landscape. Proponents explained the contents of their bills to their colleagues in an extensive, substantive debate. It seems only sensible, then, to take what they said seriously. Cf.
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2416
(1995) (attaching particular significance to the explanations of a bill provided by its floor
manager); City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1782 n.9 (1995) (relying on
other provisions enacted contemporaneously with the statute under examination as a telling
indication of the meaning that statute could sensibly bear); cf. Hubbard v. United States,
115 S. Ct. 1754, 1757-58 (1995) (recognizing that in criminal cases Congress itself has expressly asked the courts to take the context of statutory terms into account).
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claims that had previously been considered and rejected in state
court.1 33 When that proposal evoked opposition, the Parker Com-

mittee abandoned it in favor of other, procedural measures-among them a codification of the exhaustion doctrine. That
revised package was enacted as part of the general revision of the
Judicial Code in 1948.1"4 Thereafter, in Brown v. Allen,13 5 the Supreme Court confirmed that the Habeas Corpus Act, as amended,
authorized the federal courts to exercise independent judgment regarding legal and mixed questions-notwithstanding previous state
court decisions on those issues.
In the wake of Brown, the Parker Committee offered a new
proposal that would have deprived the federal courts of authority
to award relief on the basis of claims previously found wanting in
state court-provided" the state courts arrived at their decisions in
a "fair and adequate" manner.136 In this, the Committee borrowed
from Professor Paul Bator, who had recently advanced the thesis
that federal habeas should be governed by the "process model"
typically associated with the law of preclusion.1 3 7 By Bator's account, the federal courts should have jurisdiction to entertain
habeas petitions from state prisoners, but should be precluded
from granting relief on the basis of claims the state courts rejected-after "full and fair" process. 38 The federal courts, accordingly, should focus not on whether the state courts reached correct
outcomes, but rather on whether those courts engaged a process
that assured "a reasoned probability that the facts were correctly
found and the law correctly applied."139 Concerning outcomes, Ba133. See generally John W. Winkle, Judges as Lobbyists: Habeas Corpus Reform in
the 1940s, 68 JUDICATURE 263 (1985).
134. See S. REP.No. 1527, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
135. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
136. Specifically, the Committee proposed that a federal court should be able to entertain a collateral attack on a state court judgment only on a ground which presents a substantial Federal constitutional question;
(1) which was not theretofore raised and determined;
(2) which there was no fair and adequate opportunity theretofore to raise and have
determined; and
(3) which cannot thereafter be raised and determined in a proceeding in the State
court, by an order or judgment subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States
on writ of certiorari.
Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus, 33 F.R.D. 363, 367 (1964); see Hearings on
H.R. 5649 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess 1 (1955).
137. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners,76 HARv.L. REv. 441 (1963).
138. Id. at 456-57.
139. Id. at 455.
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tor contended that a prisoner was "legally detained if he [was] held
pursuant to the judgment... of a competent [state] tribunal...,
even though the decision to detain rested on an error as to law or
fact. ' 140 Incorporating this thesis, the new Parker Committee bill
was introduced on numerous
141 occasions over the next several years,

but never won acceptance.

In 1968, both the idea of giving prior state judgments preclusive effect in federal habeas and the idea of eliminating the federal
courts' subject matter jurisdiction were revived in the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, sponsored by Senators Ervin
and McClellan.142 That sweeping proposal elicited an outpouring
of
4
opposition, and in response its proponents-withdrew it. 8
Recognizing that any attempt to withdraw the federal courts'
habeas jurisdiction would be resisted, the Nixon Administration
built its plan for the writ chiefly on Bator's model. In a presentation to the Judicial Conference Subcommittee on Habeas Corpus,
the Justice Department suggested that the federal courts should
retain their formal authority to entertain petitions from state prisoners, but that they should be instructed to give "conclusive
weight" to previous state judgments-so long as prisoners were accorded "an adequate opportunity to have full and fair consideration" of their claims in state court. 1 44 Senator Hruska introduced a
140. Id. at 447-48 (quoting
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

HENRY HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS

1238 (1953)).

141. See Brief on behalf of Benjamin R. Civiletti, Nicholas Katzenbach, Edward H.
Levi, Elliot L. Richardson, et al., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992). In 1966, by contrast,
Congress enacted different amendments, proposed by the Judicial Conference of the United
States, which took Brown as their premise and established a general, rebuttable presumption in favor of state court findings of historical fact, as opposed to state court conclusions
of law or applications of law to fact. See S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). On
the Bator model, see Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991
(1985).
142. A key provision of that bill read as follows:
The judgment of a court of a State upon a plea or verdict of guilty in a criminal
action shall be conclusive with respect to all questions of law or fact which were
determined, or which could have been determined, in that action until such judgment is reversed, vacated, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to review by
appeal or certiorari such judgment; and neither the Supreme Court nor any inferior court ordained and established by Congress under Article IlI of the Constitution of the United States shall have jurisdiction to reverse, vacate, or modify any
such judgment of a State court except upon appeal from, or upon review thereof
by the highest court of that State having jurisdiction to review such judgment.
S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 702 (1968). See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-65

(1968).
143. See 114 CONG. REc. 11,234, 14,181-84 (1968); 119 CONG. REc. 2221 (1973).
144. Letter from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, to J. Edward
Lumbard, Circuit Judge (Aug. 20, 1971).
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bill containing such a plan a short time later. When the full Judicial Conference opposed that bill, however, it died without reaching the floor. 14 5 Once again in the 1970s, accordingly, the intense
opposition to measures that would undercut the federal courts'
ability to award relief on the basis of meritorious claims parried
bills of that kind.
Efforts to restrict habeas resumed in the early 1980s when a
Task Force on Violent Crime recommended various procedural
amendments to the Habeas Corpus Act,146 and bills along those
lines were introduced in both houses of Congress. 47 In the hearings that followed, Justice Department witnesses expressed reservations about measures that touched only procedural matters and
argued that, in addition, Congress should enact a new statute restricting the scope of the federal courts' function with respect to
the merits of claims. 4" At that time, the Department still preferred "simple abolition" of the federal courts' jurisdiction to issue
the writ on behalf of state convicts. 49
B.

The Compromises Necessary for Victory

1. The First Concession. The failures of the past made it
clear that it was politically infeasible either to repeal the Habeas
Corpus Act entirely or to limit the federal courts to an assessment
of state process. Accordingly, when the Reagan Administration unveiled its own reform package, it bowed to political reality. The
new Administration's bill contained a provision that, on its face,
incorporated Bator's model: "An application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
has been fully and fairly adjudicated in State proceedings .... 150
Yet in accompanying commentary, the Justice Department
made the first of the three concessions that would ultimately pro145. S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The Justice Department also championed a
proposal to limit the federal courts to claims directly related to guilt or innocence, and the
Hruska bill also incorporated that idea. See Henry Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970).
146. Report of the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Seas.
321 (1981).
147. S. 653, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981); H.R. 5679, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
148. Hearings on S. 653 Before the Subcommittee on Courts of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1982) (statement of Jonathan C. Rose on behalf
of the Department of Justice).
149. William French Smith, Proposalsfor Habeas CorpusReform, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM:

A

BLUEPRINT

137, 147 (1983).

150. S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1982).
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duce an enacted habeas corpus law. The Department explained
that, despite its express language, this provision would retain the
federal courts' ability to adjudicate the validity of prisoners' claims
on the merits. Under the "full-and-fair" program, federal habeas
corpus would not be restricted to an examination of the adequacy
of state court process. By contrast, the federal courts would retain
authority to judge the validity of state court outcomes-albeit indirectly in the traditional manner of habeas jurisdiction.
This is not to say that the full-and-fair plan would perpetuate
Brown v. Allen. The Justice Department's commentary criticized
Brown and explained that under the bill the federal courts' consideration of previous state court judgments would be different. In
essence, state decisions on the merits would have to be
"reasonable":
[A] state adjudication would be full and fair in the sense of the proposed
subsection (d) if: (i) the claim at issue was actually considered and decided
on the merits in state proceedings; (ii) the factual determination of the
state court, the disposition resulting from its application of the law to the
facts, and its view of the applicable rule of federal law were reasonable;
(iii) the adjudication was consistent with the procedural requirements of
federal law; and (iv) there is no new evidence of substantial importance
which could not reasonably have been produced at the time of the state
adjudication and no subsequent change of law of substantial importance has
occurred.""

For years thereafter, Republican proponents of limits on
habeas advanced numerous bills containing the full-and-fair provision-always accompanied by this same (inconsistent) assurance
that they meant to maintain the federal courts' ability to adjudicate the merits of claims-in order to decide whether previous
state decisions were "reasonable.

' 152

On that basis, the Senate

151. The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearings on S. 2216 Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1982) (analysis of bill text).
152. E.g., Habeas Corpus Issues: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 153-54 (1991)
(statement of Andrew G. McBride, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Dep't of Justice).
Dissenting from a committee report endorsing a Democratic bill in 1991, House Republican
leaders reconfirmed this initial concession:
The full and fair standard of review in the [alternative Republican] proposal encompasses two essential requirements:
(1) the state determination must be reasonable, including a reasonable interpretation and application of federal law, and a reasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented to the state court; and
(2) [t]he state adjudication must be carried out in a manner consistent with
the procedural requirements of federal law that apply in state proceedings. ...
Review under this standard is not limited to considering the adequacy of the
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passed bills including the full-and-fair program in 1984153 and
1991. MT' Yet reform legislation containing the full-and-fair rule was
never enacted. 5 '
The full-and-fair program failed for two reasons. First, many
members of Congress were concerned that the full-and-fair provision would be read literally to embrace Professor Bator's approach,
such that federal courts would be forced to rubberstamp state
court outcomes, so long as the state procedures in which those outcomes were reached were adequate.'5 6 On this point, critics insisted
procedures used by the state courts, but includes, as indicated above, a determination by the federal habeas court that the state decision was reasonable. This understanding has been consistently maintained by the proponents of the proposal
throughout its decade-long consideration by Congress.
H. REP. 102-242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 394 (1991) (citing previous instances in which authoritative proponents of the full-and-fair formulation had explained it in this way).
153. S. 1763, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984); see generally S. REP. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); 130 CONG. REC. 1854-72 (1984).
154. 137 CONG. REc. S8660-61 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (showing the adoption of an
amendment to the pending Democratic crime bill).
155. As reform bills stumbled repeatedly over the full-and-fair program, the Supreme
Court concluded that problems associated with habeas corpus proceedings in death penalty
cases demanded prompt attention. In the summer of 1988, Chief Justice Rehnquist asked
Justice Powell to chair a special ad hoc committee of the Judicial Conference, charged to
study capital habeas cases and offer recommendations. The Powell Committee's report, filed
in 1989, suggested numerous adjustments in habeas practice in death penalty cases, but
presupposed that the federal courts would continue adjudicating the merits of claims independently. Most Republican reform bills thereafter embraced at least some of those recommendations, albeit most of those bills contained the full-and-fair provision as well-despite
the apparent inconsistency. E.g., S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1400, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991).
156. In 1991, Senator Graham condemned the full-and-fair rule on precisely this
ground: "Essentially, [the full-and-fair formulation) says that if the Federal court finds that
the State court. . .dealt in a full and fair manner, the Federal court is precluded from any
further consideration." 137 CONG. REc. S8654 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Graham).
Reacting to a full-and-fair amendment by Rep. Hyde in 1991, the chair of the House
Judiciary Committee, Rep. Brooks, argued as follows: "The fine print says that if a State
simply declares that a person was given a full and fair proceeding, the actual fact of whether
the 14th amendment protections of due process and equal protection were provided does
not matter." 137 CONG. REc. H7999 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
Rep. Edwards, chair of the relevant subcommittee, agreed: "[T]here is no precedent for
saying that ['full and fair adjudication'] means anything but procedural compliance ....
[F]ull and fair means only procedural fairness." Id. at 7894 (statement of Rep. Edwards).
Rep. Jenkins offered a similar view: "What 'full and fair adjudication' really means is
that if the State court proceeding was procedurally adequate, the fact that the State court
was dead wrong on the law is irrelevant." Id. at H8000 (statement of Rep. Jenkins).
Other opponents agreed. Rep. Hughes had this to say: "[A] State court decision can be
full, fair, and, at the same time, dead wrong. 'Full and fair' goes to procedural rights."
Id. at H8003 (statement of Rep. Hughes).
Rep. Fish, the ranking Republican member of the Judiciary Committee, voiced the
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that if the language of a statute clearly indicated such a process
model, nothing in the legislative history
would persuade the courts
157
to read it in another, unfamiliar way.
Second, even if the full-and-fair formulation were understood
to permit the federal courts to ensure 'that state decisions were
"reasonable," many members were also concerned that violations
of constitutional rights would still go uncorrected. In their view,
the federal courts should continue to award habeas relief if the
state courts were wrong, not just "unreasonably" wrong. On this
further point, critics focused particular attention on state court applications of federal legal standards to the facts of particular
cases-that is, on mixed question cases. They insisted that the federal courts should not be told to defer to erroneous state judgments on mixed
questions merely because the state courts acted
"reasonably. 1 ' 8
The full-and-fair scheme was not only unsuccessful. It elicited
competing proposals from Democrats and moderate Republicans
like Senator Specter. Those competing programs typically either
endorsed Brown by implication or proposed expressly to codify the
Court's decision in that case.1 59 As the battle lines were drawn,
Senator Specter developed an especially important position between the warring camps. For his own part, Specter argued that
Congress should concentrate on expediting the habeas process. In
that vein, he urged his colleagues to eliminate the usual requirement that capital petitioners exhaust state postconviction remedies
and to establish timetables for federal court action on habeas petisame understanding of the full-and-fair formulation: "[T]his standard leaves the Federal
courts without power to remedy constitutional violations if State courts have considered the
issue in a procedurally fair forum." Id. at H8001 (statement of Rep. Fish).
157. For doubts regarding the likelihood that background assurances would ensure that
the statute would not be read to restrict the federal courts to an appraisal of process, see
The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearings on S. 2216 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 153-54 (1982) (testimony of Phyllis Skloot Bamberger, Attorney in Charge, Appeals Division, Federal Defender Services Unit, Legal Aid Society of
New York).
158. Resisting the full-and-fair plan in 1991, Rep. Hughes argued as follows:
The Department [of Justice] states that this ["full and fair"] language still permits Federal Courts to reverse State errors "where a State court defied or disregarded Supreme Court precedent." The Federal writ of habeas corpus exists to
correct erronious [sic] applications of law. It is not limited to rulings which defy or
show contempt for Supreme Court precedent. It is not limited to rulings which are
both erroneous and arbitrary, nor ones which are erronious [sic] and unreasonable.
137 CONG. REC. H8004 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
159. E.g., H.R. 5269, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); see H. REP. No. 681, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990).
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tions.1 60 Specter made it clear, however, that he opposed the fulland-fair plan, because it would undercut the federal courts' ability
to exercise independent judgment on the merits of claims.16 1
On one occasion in 1990, Specter convinced Senator Thurmond and other key Republicans to endorse a bill that would have
made the kinds of procedural adjustments that Specter favored-without touching the federal courts' consideration of the
merits of claims. The Senate adopted that bill, but it was later
dropped in conference. Specter introduced essentially the same bill
in the 102d and 103d Congresses, always obtaining
significant sup16 2
port, but never again managing a majority.
2. The Second Concession. As time wore on, support for alternatives to the full-and-fair formulation continued to build in

both bodies. And in response, proponents of a restrictive bill extended the second concession crucial to their ultimate success. In
October of 1991, the House was debating a Democratic habeas bill
opposed by the Republican leadership. The floor manager on the
Republican side, Rep. Hyde, initially offered an amendment con160. E.g., 137 CONG. REC. S8873-S75 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (explaining the timetables he had in mind).
161. Sen. Specter explained:
The bill which I have proposed preserves Federal habeas corpus in its entirety.
When my distinguished colleague from Delaware talks about some who want to
eliminate Federal habeas corpus because of the full and fair doctrine, that is not
this Senator. I believe that the full and fair doctrine would just result in more
remands to the State court to decide what was full and fair.
139 CONG. REC. S15,738 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Specter).
In 1991, Specter voted for a full-and-fair initiative by Senators Thurmond and
Hatch-apparently because the proponents agreed to include in their bill the kind of timetables he advocated for federal court action on habeas petitions. 137 CONG. REC. S8656,
S8661 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Sen. Specter). On the floor, Specter muted the
significance of the full-and-fair rule and, indeed, insisted that it would permit the federal
courts to "deal with the merits." Id. at S8656.
Senator Biden responded that Specter's assessment of the full-and-fair rule was "much
more generous" than anyone else's. Id. at S8664. Specter persisted, but it was plain that his
heart was not in it. Id. at S8665 (conceding that the full-and-fair provision was "virtually
impossible to understand"). After a conference committee dropped the Senate full-and-fair
program (and his own procedural provisions with it), Specter joined a Republican filibuster
that defeated the entire crime bill in the 102d Congress. Specter complained that the conference committee's plan failed to embrace his ideas for expediting capital cases. He pointedly explained, however, that he did not fault the conference report for dropping the Senate-passed full-and-fair provision: "I supported the Senate-passed habeas reform proposal
because in most respects I supported its provisions. I was deely [sic] concerned, however,
about the restriction of habeas review when an issue had received a full and fair adjudication in the State courts." 137 CONG. REC. S18682 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991).
162. See, e.g., S. 19, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); 137 CONG. REC. S620 (daily ed. Jan.
14, 1991).
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taining the full-and-fair provision. When that provision evoked the
usual resistance, Rep. Hyde withdrew his amendment in favor of a
substitute that, in effect, supplanted the full-and-fair section with
the following new provision:
An adjudication of a claim in State proceedings is full and fair within the
meaning of this section. . .unless the adjudication-

(1) was conducted in a manner inconsistent with the procedural requirements of Federal law that are applicable to the State proceeding;
(2) was contrary to or involved an arbitrary or unreasonable interpretation or application of clearly established Federal law; or
(3) involved an arbitrary or unreasonable determination of the facts
16 3
in light of the evidence presented.

The import of this initiative was clear. It responded forthrightly to one of the two principal arguments that critics had
raised against the full-and-fair formulation. If other members in
the House were concerned that the full-and-fair provision would
limit the federal courts to an evaluation of state court process, and
if those members could not be persuaded that a statement to the
contrary in the legislative history would rebut that understanding,
then Hyde would lift his explanation of the full-and-fair provision
into the bill itself.1 64 This was an enormously important move on
the part of Republican proponents of habeas legislation in the
House. After this point, they abandoned further attempts to impose Bator's model and substituted statutory language ensuring
that the federal courts would continue to address the substantive
merits of claims raised in habeas corpus."6 5
Notwithstanding this second significant concession, key members of the House remained dissatisfied. Democrats and Republicans alike expressed the view that Rep. Hyde's substitute still
would not allow the federal courts the independence needed to enforce federal rights. Still, the federal courts would be unable to
163. 137 CONG. REc. H7996 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991).
164. Rep. Hyde was frank to admit that his actions were in response to the opposition:
"Itis true that the Judicial Conference was unhappy with the full and fair standard until we
offered an amendment which covers more than just procedural reasonableness." 137 CONG.
REc. H7895 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
165. See 137 CONG. REc. H8003-H04 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Hughes) (acknowledging Rep. Hyde's concession, albeit finding his effort inadequate). The
Reagan Justice Department had once admitted that its explanation of the full-and-fair rule
might better be substituted for the full-and-fair rule itself in the text of the original bill in
1982. See The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearings on S. 2216 Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1982) (response to criticism offered by Attorney
Jim Smith of Florida). It is telling, then, that this move was not made by proponents of the
full-and-fair plan until nearly a decade later-when the move was made defensively.
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correct erroneous state judgments on legal and mixed questions,
but would be limited, instead, to curing "arbitrary" or "unreasonable" state court errors. 168 And in the end, the House rejected the
Hyde substitute in favor of the bill advanced by the Democratically-controlled Judiciary Committee-which, of course, contained
neither the 7full-and-fair plan nor the language in Rep. Hyde's
1

substitute.

A conference committee appointed to reconcile the House and
Senate bills in the 102d Congress accepted the House habeas language over a full-and-fair program adopted by the Senate. The
House embraced the conference report," 8 but a filibuster in the
" 9 Similar disagreeSenate prevented further action in that body.16
ments between Democrats and Republicans in the Senate also prevented passage of reform legislation in the 103d Congress.1 70 Then,
too, the Republican leadership's insistence on the full-and-fair
plan eliminated the chance for compromise. Importantly, however,
Senator Specter obtained 34 votes for his own alternative bill in
the 103d Congress-a bill that would have explicitly repudiated
the full-and-fair rule. 7
166. Rep. Fish in particular said that the Hyde substitute was insufficient:
It is clear that the attempted definition of "full and fair adjudication" does not
alleviate. . .concerns [about leaving the federal courts unable to cure state court
error on the merits]. The judiciary, the ABA, and much of the legal community
strongly opposes "full and fair," even as defined by the gentleman's amendment.
137 CONG. REC. H8001 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Fish).
167. H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). Rep. McCollum said at the height of the
debate that he saw "no reason" why the House would not adopt Rep. Hyde's habeas initiative, which simply carried forward the same full-and-fair program that members had "been
debating... for a number of years ....
." 137 CONG. REc. H7971 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1991)
(statement of Rep. McCollum). There was, however, a very good reason: the votes for fulland-fair simply could not be found.
168. 137 CONG. REC. H11,756 (Nov. 26, 1991).
169. For unsuccessful cloture votes, see 137 CONG. REc. S18,615-616 (daily ed. Nov. 27,
1991); 137 CONG. REC. S3926-44 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1992).
170. In the fall of 1993, Senators Biden and Hatch agreed to eliminate all habeas
corpus measures from the crime bill in order that divisions over their competing initiatives
would not derail crime legislation entirely, as had been the case in the previous Congress.
The agreement was announced by Senators Mitchell and Dole, 139 CONG. REC. S15,584-85
(daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993), and was later explained by the floor leaders themselves. See 139
CONG. REc. S15,810 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993) (statement by Senator Hatch); id. at S15,81011 (also confirming the agreement).
171. S.1657, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see 139 CONG. REc. S15,815 (daily ed. Nov.
17, 1993). Senator Specter's initiative included most of Senator Biden's bill at the time, S.
1441, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993), 139 CONG. REc. S10925-31 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993), which
contained the following provision:

Section 2254(a) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following. "Except as to Fourth Amendment claims controlled by Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Federal courts, in reviewing an application under

1996]

THE NEW HABEAS CORPUS STATUTE

433

3. The Third and Crucial Concession. The statute finally enacted by the 104th Congress is the product of two convergent
events-the election of many new Republican members in 1994
and the concessions that proponents made to doubtful colleagues,
old and new. Having failed to satisfy opponents with their first and
second concessions, Republican leaders offered a third and decisive
concession, which finally won the day. The critical events unfolded
in the following way.
a. Initial House Action in the 104th Congress. Republican
leaders in the House originally introduced a new habeas bill that
omitted both the full-and-fair rule and Rep. Hyde's 1991 substitute. Setting to one side any attempt to affect the federal court's
treatment of the merits of claims, that original "Contract with
America" bill focused entirely on procedural changes 1 in
the habeas
72
system, especially in the processing of capital cases.
It was not until the "contract" bill was on the floor that Rep.
Cox proposed an amendment addressed to the federal courts' function with respect to the merits. That amendment was adopted and
thus became part of the House crime bill in 1995. The Cox amendment tracked the Hyde substitute in 1991:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect
to any claim that was decided on the merits in State proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitrary or unreasonable interpretation of clearly established Federal law as articulated in

the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States;
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitrary or unreasonable application to the facts of clearly established Federal law as articulated in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(3) resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitrary or unreasonable determination17 8of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State proceeding.

While this amendment plainly sought to affect the federal
courts' consideration of prior state court judgments on the merits,
it deliberately avoided the process model associated with the fullthis section, shall review de novo the rulings of a State court on matters of Federal
law, including the application of Federal law to facts, regardless of whether the
opportunity for a full and fair hearing on such Federal questions has been provided in the State court.
Id. at S10928.
172. H.R. 3, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
173. 141 CoNM. REc. H1424 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995).
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and-fair program. That idea had been repudiated in the House on
many occasions and could no longer be seriously advanced. Following the course previously charted by Rep. Hyde, this new provision
conceded on its face that the federal courts would continue to consider the merits of prisoners' claims. Still, the exacting language in
the Cox amendment suggested that the scope of federal adjudication would be tightly circumscribed.
Under the Cox amendment, it appeared that a federal court
would be unable to award relief on the basis of a claim that had
previously been rejected in state court-even though the federal
court concluded that the state court decision was erroneous and
that the prisoner's federal constitutional rights had been violated.
For the exceptions to the general rule against federal habeas relief
were extremely narrow.
The first exception allowed a federal court to act if the prior
state court decision was an "arbitrary or unreasonable interpretation" of constitutional law as "clearly established" in Supreme
Court precedents. That language underscored the co-equal status
of the state courts within the federal framework. A state court
would be held to account only for adherence to federal law as elaborated by the Supreme Court itself (not, this is to say, by the lower
federal courts). Moreover, a state decision on the merits would be
sufficient to justify a prisoner's detention so long as it was not "arbitrary or unreasonable." Bluntly stated, a federal habeas court
would have to defer to a previous state court decision, even if the
state judgment was erroneous in the federal court's eyes.
The second exception overlapped with the first, but apparently dealt more directly with state court decisions on mixed questions of law and fact. Under the Cox amendment, a federal court
would be unable to grant relief on a claim, unless the state court
decision constituted an "arbitrary or unreasonable" application of
"clearly established" constitutional principles to the facts of an individual case. Thus it appeared that a federal court would be
barred from taking action even if the state court misapplied the
correct legal standard-unless the state court's action was "arbitrary or unreasonable."
The third exception, which allowed a federal court to grant
relief if the state court reached an "arbitrary or unreasonable" determination of the facts underlying a constitutional claim, added
little flexibility, given the comparative rigidity of the first two exceptions. In the end, the Cox amendment would have barred the
federal courts from granting relief in cases in which the state
courts had committed serious error.
The Cox amendment was hotly debated on the floor. In some
respects, Democratic leaders raised what were by now familiar ar-
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guments. Thus Rep. Conyers condemned the Cox amendment as a
"throwback" to the "full and fair concept" that had deadlocked
Congress for years. 7 4 Conyers also argued that it was inconsistent
with the procedural reforms in the principal bill-which presupposed that the federal courts would exercise independent judgment
on the merits of prisoners' claims. 175
An exchange between Rep. Watt and Rep. Cox was, however,
more revealing. Initially, Rep. Watt argued that federal courts
would find it difficult to label a state court decision "arbitrary and
unreasonable" and thus would effectively be unable to act even in
cases in which the Cox amendment appeared to permit federal rellef.2 s Rep. Cox responded that his amendment referred to "arbitrary" state court action and "unreasonable" state court action in
the disjunctive, not the conjunctive, and that, accordingly, the
more demanding of the two standards (the requirement that the
state court decision must have been "reasonable") rendered the
other superfluous:
Mr. Chairman, I just point out that the language of the amendments says

reasonable. It also says arbitrary. But a separate standard is reasonable. It
is arbitrary or unreasonable. Obviously, the reasonableness test is the more

difficult to meet. Simply stated, the Federal courts will defer to reasonable
decisions on the facts, reasonable decisions on the law, and reasonable deci17
sions on mixed questions of law and fact made at [sic] the State courts. 7

In this way, Rep. Cox expressly disowned the reference in his
amendment to "arbitrary" state court decisions and retreated to
the position that state decisions must be "reasonable" if they were
to survive. With that explanation, Cox obtained sufficient votes to
win passage in the House.""' Still, that was as far as the Cox
amendment moved in the 104th Congress.
b. Subsequent Action in the Senate. The decisive action on
habeas in the 104th Congress occurred in the Senate. Senator
Hatch initially introduced a bill containing the familiar full-andfair provision. 79 Early on, however, Hatch recognized that, once
again, there was strong opposition to the full-and-fair rule not only
from Democrats, but also from Republicans like Senator Specter.
Mindful of Specter's 34 votes in the preceding Congress, Hatch en174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at H1425.
141 CONG. REc. H1347 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1995).
141 CONG. REc. H1426 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995).
Id.
Id. at H1427-28.
S. 3, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1994).
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tered into negotiations with Specter in pursuit of a compromise
bill on which both could agree. After some weeks of discussions,
Hatch and Specter co-sponsored such a compromise bill,180 and
Hatch set his original bill aside. Both Hatch and Specter explained
their new bill as a sensible compromise that would allow Specter to
join the leadership of his party in a final drive for habeas corpus
legislation. 181 The new Hatch/Specter bill was later incorporated
into the Senate anti-terrorism bill in the 104th Congress, which
won initial passage in the summer of 1995182 and later was enacted
as Pub. L. 104-132.
Like the Hyde substitute in 1991 and the recent Cox amendment in the House, the Hatch/Specter compromise bill dropped
the full-and-fair provision and substituted a provision allowing the
federal courts to award relief on the merits, notwithstanding prior

state court action. Unlike the Cox initiative, however, the Hatch/
180. S. 623, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).

181. 141 CONG. REC. S4590-96 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995). Introducing the new bill, Senator Specter listed his many previous attempts to obtain a majority for his own habeas bills.
Id. at S4591-92. Explaining the agreement reached in this instance, Senator Hatch was explicit regarding his compromise with Specter: "[Senator Specter] has long been an advocate
for habeas reform. Together, we have worked hard to craft a consensus bill that will enact
meaningful reform of the Federal habeas corpus process. Today, we are introducing as legislation the product of those labors." Id. at S4596.
Later, Senator Specter said that he had agreed to co-sponsor the bill because, "in the
current context in which habeas corpus appeals now run for as long as a couple of decades,
the deterrent effect of capital punishment has been virtually eliminated." 141 CONG. REc.
S7804 (daily ed. June 7, 1995). Senator Hatch, too, said that the bill was meant to "get rid
of these frivolous appeals. . .and get the system so it works in a just and fair way. . . ." Id.
at 87805. Moreover, Hatch insisted that the bill would "protect civil liberties and constitutional rights" while at the same time protecting the victims of crime and the general public
from "incessant appeals." Id.
Resisting an amendment that would have limited the habeas provisions in the bill to
prisoners attacking federal convictions, Senator Hatch said that some terrorism cases might
give rise to state criminal charges. Then, he said:
[If] we do not reform Federal habeas corpus review of State cases, then we will
have the same incessant, frivolous appeals ad hominem [sic], day and night, from
that point on because this amendment would not take care of that problem. If we
are going to pass habeas reform, let us pass real habeas reform. Let us do it
straight up. Let us protect the constitutional rights, which our amendment does
do in the bill. Let us protect civil liberties, but let us get some finality into the law
so that the frivolous appeal game will be over."
Id. at S7808.
Resisting another amendment regarding reimbursements for support services needed by
appointed counsel in habeas cases, Hatch again explained that he was primarily concerned
with "delay" and that he did not "want the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing to have
to wait 17 or 20 years for justice." Id. at 87821. "That," he said, "is why we need habeas
corpus reform." Id.
182. S.735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); 141 CONG. Rc. S7857 (daily ed. June 7,
1995).
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Specter bill made yet a third concession to members of Congress
who remained troubled by the language that Cox had proposed. It
was this third and final concession, and only this third and final
concession, that ultimately summoned sufficient votes to pass a
habeas corpus statute. Without it, proponents would once again
have been frustrated by members who were so concerned about
undermining federal adjudication of federal claims that they preferred a bill with no provision at all on the effect of previous adjudication in state court. The critical vote on the Senate floor was on
an amendment by Senator Biden that would have deleted this single provision from the pending bill. That amendment failed by an
extremely
thin margin (53 to 46), with many Republicans voting
s3
it.
for
The character of the crucial final concession that Senator
Hatch offered his critics is plain from the face of the language now
in § 2254(d),'" which departs from the Cox initiative in extremely
important respects. Specifically, it makes at least two grammatical
changes in the exceptions to the general rule against federal habeas
corpus relief-adjustments that plainly confirm the ability of a
federal court to grant relief when it finds a claim to be meritorious.
First, § 2254(d) as enacted drops any reference to "arbitrary"
state departures from Supreme Court precedent. In this respect,
§ 2254(d) responds favorably to Rep. Watt's criticism of the Cox
amendment in the House. Where Rep. Cox explained that the
grammar of his amendment rendered its reference to "arbitrary"
state decisions superfluous, § 2254(d) takes the unnecessary (but
politically advantageous) further step of simply deleting reference
to "arbitrary" state decisions. Second, and much more importantly, § 2254(d) also eliminates the significance of the reference
to "unreasonable" state court decisions. The disjunctive "or" at
the end of paragraph (1) is all-important. Just as a similar disjunctive in the Cox amendment rendered the reference to "arbitrary"
state decisions in that amendment superfluous, so the disjunctive
here renders § 2254(d)'s reference to "unreasonable" state court
applications of federal law equally superfluous. The only language
doing any genuine work in § 2254(d) is the language establishing
the basic rule that a federal court is authorized to award habeas
relief if a previous state court judgment was "contrary to" federal
law as "clearly established" by the Supreme Court.
This last concession is extremely consequential. For it deliberately (and skillfully) abandons the chief objective that Republicans
183. 141 CONG. REc. S7849-50 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
184. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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had advocated for a dozen years: the goal of requiring a federal
habeas court to defer to a "reasonable" state court decision on the
merits-even if, in the federal court's view, the state judgment was
in error. This concession was obviously painful to habeas critics,
some of whom continued to defend a "reasonableness" rule on the
Senate floor. Yet discarding that idea was absolutely vital to the
compromise that won sufficient support from Senator Specter and
others, so that the larger package of habeas corpus measures could
finally be enacted.185 Senator Hatch fully appreciated the significance of his action. He, too, continued to insist that "reasonable"
state court decisions should be undisturbed. Yet now he had it that
a state 1 court
judgment could not be both "reasonable" and
86
",wrong."

c.

The Floor Debates in the 104th Congress. The effect of

§ 2254(d) on the substance of habeas adjudication was clarified in

the floor debates when proponents reacted to an amendment by
Senator Biden, which would have struck this provision from the
Hatch/Specter bill. Senator Biden argued that § 2254(d) would
undermine the independence of the federal courts in that it would
require them to give "deference" to previous state court judgments. Biden plainly used the term "deference" in an extremely
strong sense. As he read § 2254(d), it foreclosed a federal court
185. 141 CONG. Rac. S7846 (daily ed. June 7, 1995). It is true that the Hyde amendment also included the "contrary to" test (and also in the disjunctive). Yet that proposal
also contained the reference to "arbitrary" state decisions, and Hyde himself focused almost
exclusively on deference to "reasonable" state judgments. In any case, Cox plainly jettisoned
any hope that might have sprung from the Hyde formulation.
186. In a hearing on S. 623 before the Senate Judiciary Committee, a witness on behalf
of the American Bar Association, Douglas Robinson, expressed concern that the bill would
prevent a federal court from granting habeas relief if a previous state court decision against
the prisoner was "reasonable," but still
"wrong." After the hearing, Senator Hatch sent
Robinson a telling question in an apparent effort to clarify his testimony:
You have testified that the provision of S.623 that would require federal courts to
defer in habeas petitions to state court adjudications that are not "unreasonable"
interpretations of federal law, will result in the affirmance of state court interpretations of federal law which are, in your words, "'reasonable,' even if they are
wrong." Could you expand on how an interpretation of federal constitutional law
could be wrong, that is contrary to established federal law, and yet still be a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution?
Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to Douglas G. Robinson (April 26, 1995) (on file with author)
(emphasis in original).
It is plain from this rhetorical question that Senator Hatch had now collapsed the bill's
reference to "unreasonable" state court applications of federal law into its reference to state
decisions that were "contrary to. . .clearly established law." Now, according to Hatch, an
erroneous state decision was necessarily both "contrary to" established law and
"unreasonable."
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from "examining what the State courts did in any event... : ,87
Senator Biden acknowledged that the federal courts would retain
authority to award relief in the case of "unreasonable" state court
decisions, but he charged that such an "exception" was "illusory"
and would not allow the federal courts to cure erroneous state decisions with respect to federal rights. l"8
Senator Hatch dismissed Biden's characterization of § 2254(d)

out of hand and complained that Biden's staff had developed a
misleading poster (set on a tripod in the well of the Senate chamber) that simply missed the point of the provision under discussion: "I notice [that] the... Biden staff-prepared poster. . .says
that Specter-Hatch requires Federal courts to defer to State courts
in almost all cases, even if the State is wrong about the U.S. Constitution. That is absolutely false."" 9
Explaining his own bill in his own words, Hatch acknowledged
that § 2254(d) would "change" the current "de novo" adjudication
standard in habeas. He freely conceded that his bill would specify
"the degree of deference" that a federal court must give to a previous state court judgment. But Hatch, for his part, used the term
"deference" in an entirely different, everyday sense. To him, "deference" did not mean acquiescence but, instead, connoted consid187. 141 CONG. REC. S7841 (daily ed. June 7, 1995). Indeed, Senator Biden associated

the "rule of deference" he read into §2254(d) with the full-and-fair rule that had been advanced in previous bills, ostensibly to introduce preclusion into federal habeas corpus. Id;
see also 141 CONG. REC. S7486 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden).
188. 141 CONG. REC. S7842 (daily ed. June 7, 1995):
First, the language sets out clearly what the general principle is. The general principle.. .is that Federal courts shall not grant a claim that was adjudicated in
State court proceedings. That is what is at the top....
The second problem, in this instance, the bill seems to allow an exception to
the general rule but one that is likely to be illusory because a claim can be granted
only if the State court's application of Federal law to the facts ... [was] not
merely wrong but unreasonable. It could be wrong but viewed as reasonable.
Some opponents could never be convinced that the bill would not "eviscerate" habeas
corpus for state prisoners by requiring the federal courts to "defer" to the state courts on
the merits of claims and thus preventing the federal courts from "correcting" constitutional
errors. See, e.g. 142 CONG. REC. S3458 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement by Sen. Kennedy) (opposing the conference committee report); id. at 83438 (statement by Sen. Moynihan) (reading § 2254(d) to "hold that constitutional protections do not exist unless they
have been unreasonably violated" and insisting that idea would "introduce a virus that
[would] surely spread throughout our system of laws"). Senator Biden persisted in his own
opposition to this provision, protesting at one point that it would bar a federal court from
deciding whether a state court "accurately interpreted the Federal Constitution." 142 CONG.
REc. S3357 (daily ed. April 16, 1996). Elsewhere, however, Biden acknowledged that § 2254
(d) might be in fact "much less onerous" than it appeared "on its face." 142 CONG. REC.
S3475 (daily ed. April 17, 1996).
189. Id. at 87846 (statement by Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added).
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eration, courtesy, and respect.
The goal of the bill was now to dispense with the notion that
the federal courts should approach federal habeas cases "de
novo"-in the special (habeas) sense that nothing the state courts
have done already matters, rather than in the orthodox (appellate)
sense that independent judgment should be brought to bear on an
extant state court action. That goal could not be achieved in a
harsh, ham-handed fashion, but only by means of a softer, textured notion-best articulated as a rule of reason:
[The standard now in § 2254(d)] is a wholly appropriate standard. It enables the Federal court to overturn State court positions that clearly contravene Federal law. Indeed, this standard essentially gives the Federal court
the authority to review de novo whether the State court decided the claim
in contravention of Federal law.
Moreover, . . . this ...

standard ... allows the Federal court to re-

view State court decisions that improperly apply clearly established Federal
law ....
What does this mean? It means that if the State court reasonably applied Federal law, its decision must be upheld. Why is that a problematic
standard? After all, Federal habeas review exists to correct fundamental defects in the law. If the State court has reasonably applied Federal law it is
hard to say that a fundamental defect exists.19'

If anything, Senator Specter's explanation of "deference" was
even more flexible. By his account, § 2254(d) leaves the federal
courts with much the same independent authority they have always had-dating at least to his own days in the practice:,
Under the current bill [Hatch/Specter], I think there is still a good bit of
latitude which the Federal judge will have when he makes a determination
190. Id. at S7848. I will not say that Senator Hatch was rigorously consistent on this
point. Defending his bill when it returned to the Senate after conference, he said that it

would "require[] deference to state court action unless there is some very good reason not to
defer" and characterized its effect as "a major, major, change in criminal law." 142 CONG.
Rc. S3362 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch). In the main, however, I
think it is fair to say that Hatch explained the bill as an effort to get the federal courts to

take proper account of prior state judgments: "Our proposed standard simply ends the improper review of State court decisions .... There is simply no reason that federal courts
should have the ability to virtually retry cases that have been properly adjudicated by our
State courts." 142 CONG. REc. S3447 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
Equally in the House, the floor manager, Representative Hyde, defended the conference
report in much the same way. Responding to the dire predictions of some Democrats, Hyde
said that under § 2254(d), "the federal judge always reviews the State court decision to see
if it is in conformity with established Supreme Court precedence [sic], or if it [sic] has been
misapplied." 142 CONG. REC. H3602 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde). So
the new statute did not establish "a blank, total deference, but it is a recognition that you
cannot relitigate these issues endlessly." Id.
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under a habeas corpus petition. There will be deference to the determinations of the state court, but the Federal judge will still have latitude to alter
the State court decision in any case in which the Federal judge determines

that it was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States ....
So there still is latitude for the Federal judge to disagree with the determination made by the State court judge. It is my sense, having litigated
these cases... that where there is a miscarriage of justice, the Federal court
can come to a different decision than was made in the State court
proceedings."1

Explanations like these disavow a radical shift from settled
law. In the end, the proponents of restrictive legislation abandoned
all their attempts to restrict the federal courts' ability to exercise
independent judgment on the merits. They substituted another,
distinctly different, means of ensuring proper attention for prior
state judgments. Having failed to achieve agreement on a bill that
would force the federal courts to defer to "reasonable" state court
judgments, the proponents of reform shifted their sights to the feature of habeas practice in the modern era that critics had always
found particularly objectionable: the federal courts' tendency to
take up the merits of claims without (in the eyes of their critics)
showing proper respect for previous judgments rendered by the
state courts.
The statute actually enacted by the 104th Congress, and
signed into law by the President, attends to that question and only
that question. This new statute states, simply (and sensibly)
enough, that when a federal court is asked to examine a claim that
191. 141 CONG. Rnc. 87847 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter). Specter
vacillated considerably more than did Hatch. When the conference report was on the floor
for final passage, he reviewed his many attempts to "streamline" the habeas process and
negotiations with Hatch over the content of the current bill. At that point, he candidly
admitted that he did not "favor" the "deference" the bill would accord to state judgments
and lamented that a state decision would have to be "unreasonable" before a federal court
could act. 142 Cong. Rec. S3471 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Specter). Specter said that the federal courts would not defer to the state courts regarding "determinations of Federal law," but he understood that "deference" would be owed to a state court
"decision applying the law to the facts." He was "not entirely comfortable" with that result,
but he insisted that the new "standard" would "allow Federal courts sufficient discretion to
ensure that convictions in state court have been obtained in conformity with the Constitution." Id.
That, I think, is consistent with the interpretation of § 2254(d) that I am defending.
Senator Specter, like Senator Hatch and Rep. Hyde, commonly (if not always consistently)
promoted § 2254(d) as a means of focusing the federal courts on previous state adjudications and the question whether the state courts acted in conformity to federal
law-whether, that is, they reached correct outcomes.
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was previously adjudicated in state court, the federal court should
not ignore the state court's work, but rather should begin with the
state court adjudication as the baseline-that is, as the object of
92
the federal court's exercise of independent judgment."
This, indeed, is precisely the interpretation that President
Clinton placed on § 2254(d) when he signed Pub. L. 104-132 into
law:
I have signed this bill because I am confident that the Federal courts will
interpret these provisions [§ 2254(d) (as amended) and § 2254(e) (as
amended)] to preserve independent review of Federal legal claims and the
192. This interpretation, anchored both in the language of § 2254(d) and in its legislative history, is far more convincing than an alternative construction that has occasionally
been advanced. Cf. 142 CONG. Rc. S3471 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Specter); see supra note 191. That alternative construction has it that § 2254(d) adopts a rigid
distinction between state court mistakes regarding abstract legal principles (i.e., mistakes in
the articulation of pure legal standards) and state court mistakes regarding the application
of abstract legal principles to individual cases (i.e., mistakes in the resolution of mixed questions of law and fact). Thus the reference to a state decision that was "contrary to...
clearly established Federal law" is said to cover cases in which a state court identified the
wrong standard to be applied in a case, and the reference to a decision involving "an unreasonable application of.. .clearly established Federal law" is said to cover cases in which a
state court misapplied the correct standard. Any such reading of § 2254(d) faces three insurmountable problems.
First, it imputes to the drafters an utterly unrealistic understanding of the way in
which courts handle constitutional questions. It is extremely rare that a state court (or any
court) fails accurately to articulate a purely legal standard. That being true, it would make
little sense to devote the key language in a statute of this kind to that peculiar situation and
to leave other language (the "unreasonable application" language) to govern almost all actual cases.
Second, and more importantly, it fails to appreciate that the reference to a state court
"adjudication" of a claim, resulting in a "decision" that was "contrary to" Federal law, must
necessarily embrace both the state court's articulation of the governing legal standard and
the state court's application of that standard to the case at bar. An "adjudication" and
"decision" in a case obviously disposes of the matter entirely. It makes no sense, then, to
read § 2254(d)'s "contrary to" language to be limited to a state court's threshold statement
of a proposition of abstract legal principle. Moreover, any such construction flatly ignores
what it is that § 2254(d) contemplates may have been "contrary to" Federal law-not the
state court's articulation of the law, but rather its actual "decision" in a case.
Third, and more importantly still, this alternative construction neglects the key linguistic differences between the Hatch/Specter compromise (i.e., § 2254(d) as enacted) and the
Cox amendment that preceded it. That precursor did contemplate that a "reasonable" state
court decision would defeat a claim in federal habeas, even if it was erroneous. By the
square grammar of § 2254(d), however, that is not true under the legislation Congress actually enacted. Of course, if a state court did apply clearly established law unreasonably, its
judgment would not prevent a federal court from granting habeas relief. Yet the very point
of the third concession made by the Hatch/Specter compromise is that a state court decision
need not have been unreasonable in order to make federal relief available. Rather, a federal
court can award relief if the state court was simply wrong-i.e., if its "decision" was "contrary to... clearly established Federal law."
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bedrock constitutional principle of an independent judiciary.
Some have suggested that [§ 2254(d)] will limit the authority of the
Federal courts to bring their own independent judgment to bear on ques,tions of law and mixed questions of law and fact that come before them on
habeas corpus....
I expect that the courts, following their usual practice of construing
ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional problems, will read [§ 2254(d)]
to permit independent Federal court review of constitutional claims. ...

VI.

ANALOGOUS CASES DISTINGUISHED

If §2254(d) were read to establish the strong "deference" rule
that Senator Biden described on the Senate floor, the result would
be unprecedented in modern experience. Searching the books, I
can find no similar instance in which Congress has even attempted,
let alone effected, the kind of flagrant interference with the federal
judicial function that such a construction of § 2254(d) would entail. Possible analogies come to mind, but each is readily
193. Signing statement, supra note 27. It is always worrisome to rely on opponents'
statements to illuminate the meaning of a pending measure. Yet it is nonetheless true in
this instance that Senator Biden appeared to acknowledge in the end that § 2254(d) entailed this focus on previous state court judgments and, for his part, offered at least the
hope that the new law would be read to allow federal relief when a state court reached an
incorrect result:
As things now stand, Federal courts take State court decisions very seriously.
They are not writing on a blank page and ignoring State court decisions right and
left. In fact, court watchers who pay close attention to the cases tell me that Federal courts grant relief only when it is pretty clear that someone's constitutional
rights have been violated. So it seems to me that even under this provision, if
Federal courts think that State courts are right on the Constitution, they will uphold it. And if they are wrong, they will not...
If a Federal court concludes the State court violated the Federal Constitution,
that, to me, is by definition-by definition-an unreasonable application of the
Federal law, and, therefore, Federal habeas corpus would able to be granted.
142 CONG. REc. S3475 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996).
Senator Levin took the same view of the "contrary to" formulation in § 2254(d):
[S]everal Members have raised the concern that the reference in the bill to an
unreasonable application of Federal law could create two different classes of constitutional violations-reasonable and unreasonable. I vote for the bill because I
have confidence that the Federal courts will not do this. I believe the courts will
conclude, as they should, that a constitutional error cannot be reasonable and that
if a State court decision is wrong, it must necessarily be unreasonable ....
I note that this provision permits a Federal court to grant a petition for
habeas corpus if the State court decision was contrary to Federal law. I interpret
this language to mean that a Federal court may grant habeas corpus-on a first
petition-any time that a State court incorrectly interprets Federal law and that
error is material to the case.
Id. at S3465.
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distinguishable.
A.

The Tax Injunction Act

The Tax Injunction Act is clearly a different matter entirely.
That statute deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to issue injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to state taxes, provided the
plaintiff has a "speedy and efficient" state remedy.19 4 In taxation

cases, then, a federal court either has jurisdiction to act or it does
not, and if it does it is authorized and obligated to adjudicate legal
and mixed issues in the conventional, independent manner-without
deference to a different judgment by any other
19 5
authority.

B.

The Administrative Law Cases

Nor do the administrative law cases offer a plausible analogy.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has held that, so long as an
agency's construction of a statute is not plainly foreclosed by the
statute itself, a federal reviewing court must accept the agency's
construction, so long as it is "reasonable." ' Ile In the administrative
law context, however, the Court has merely recognized that Congress can delegate legislative power to an agency and then can ask
a federal court to respect the law the agency produces-when the
court exercises its own, independent appellate jurisdiction. Thus
when a federal court accepts a "reasonable" agency determination,
it only gives effect to Congress' previous decision to delegate the
law-making reflected in that determination to the agency.
If the court were not to give effect to the agency action and
were, instead, to reach its own judgment on the legal or mixed
question in issue, the court would frustrate Congress' choice to
delegate legislative power to the agency rather than to exercise legislative power itself-simply by enacting the underlying statute
and leaving it to the courts to elaborate its meaning. By accepting
a "reasonable" agency determination, an Article III court respects
Congress' choice to share legislative power with the agency. Con194. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
195. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982). Decisions regarding
the Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342, are in accord. E.g., Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Council
on Water Co. Lands of Conn., 453 F. Supp. 942, 953-954 (D. Conn. 1977), af'd, 439 U.S. 999
(1978).
196. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-44 (1984); see Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de Ia Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982)
(holding that if a statute directs an agency to exercise discretion, the judgment the agency
reaches is subject to judicial review only to determine whether it is "arbitrary").
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gress bifurcates matters-reserving some policy questions for the
agency (and thus immunizing them from independent judicial review), while assuming responsibility for other policy questions itself (and thus subjecting its own statute to independent judicial
examination). In any case, of course, the court takes full responsibility for determining the nature and contours of the power Congress has assigned to the agency and for elaborating any legislative
standard that Congress has not seen fit to delegate. 9 7
In the habeas context, by contrast, Congress is not in a position to delegate law-making authority to state courts and, then, to
effectuate that delegation by instructing the federal courts to accept state court decisions. There is no federal nonconstitutional
law to be made in these cases-which turn, of course, on federal
constitutional law. So there is no sensible argument that Congress
can somehow force an Article III court to embrace a previous state
court decision on the theory that in doing so it merely effectuates
Congress' delegation of law-making authority to the state courts.1 98
C.

Judicial Enforcement of Previously Validated Regulations

The rare instances in which Congress has divided decisionmaking authority for a case between two Article III courts have no
bearing here. To be sure, in Yakus v. United States, e99 Congress
successfully called on a federal district court to enforce an agency
regulation without itself examining the validity of the regulation.
In that case, however, the defendant had previously been given an
opportunity to challenge the regulation in the Emergency Court of
Appeals. That being true, the Supreme Court approved Congress'
scheme, notwithstanding its novelty. It was, after all, a short-term,
war-time measure affecting the national security. Even at that, the
decision in Yakus was hotly contested. A dissent by Justice Rutledge raised serious constitutional objections at the time, and theorists have brooded over the decision ever since.
197. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L.
Rnv. 1, 27-28 (1983).

198. The Court drew essentially this same distinction in First Options of Chicago, Inc.
v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995). In that case, the Court confirmed that, under Chevron, all
federal courts give "a degree of legal leeway" to an agency interpretation of law within the
agency's purview. Id. at 1926. Yet no federal court gives any similar leeway to another federal court's decision to uphold an agency judgment. This is so, because the underlying federal statute assigns law-making authority to the agency in the first instance, and the first
court to examine the agency's work must recognize as much. Once such a court has accepted
an agency decision, however, there is no justification for extending any similar deference to
that judicial judgment. Instead, the ordinary standard is appropriate: "questions of law are
examined de nova." Id.
199. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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Whatever may be the currency of Yakus within its own narrow
field today, there are two solid reasons why that case cannot support forcing an Article III court to surrender decision-making authority regarding a constitutional question raised in a habeas
corpus petition. First, Yakus approved only a congressional scheme
to distribute jurisdiction between two Article III courts. However
troublesome that may be, it does arguably conform to the bedrock
understanding that Congress has considerable authority to prescribe the jurisdiction of such courts. A scheme that confers jurisdiction on an Article Ill court to entertain an action, but then instructs the court to give effect to a state court judgment regarding
a federal question, is quite a different matter.
Second, and more fundamentally, Yakus sustained a pure bifurcation of judicial power. The Emergency Court of Appeals was
given jurisdiction to determine the validity of regulations, and the
district court was given jurisdiction to enforce regulations against
alleged violators. Each court was confined to its own sphere, and
neither was asked to meddle with work assigned to the other. Here,
by contrast, the "strong deference" construction of § 2254(d)
would have it that judicial authority is orchestrated in an entirely
different way. It is not that the state courts are given independent
decision-making power with respect to one issue, while the federal
district courts are given independent decision-making power with
respect to other issues. Rather, the district court's decision-making
power is made contingent on the quality of the previous state court
judgment. There is no clean demarcation of jurisdiction, but an
overlap-which threatens the independence and integrity of both
courts. Nothing in Yakus endorses congressional action that so corrupts the judicial function.
D.

The Adequate State Ground Doctrine

There is no analogy to cases in which, when reviewing a state
court decision on writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court accepts as
authoritative a state court's interpretation of state law and limits
itself to any federal issues properly before the Court. In those
cases, as in cases like Yakus, Congress (if not the Constitution itself) simply distributes jurisdictional power for different questions
between two courts. The state court has exclusive power to decide
purely state law issues, while the Supreme Court has equally exclusive power to decide federal questions that must be determined in
order to resolve the dispute.0 0 In no sense do the two courts share
authority with respect to a single legal issue, with the one denied
200. E.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935).
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power to decide that question independently, but, instead, forced
to credit the judgment of the other notwithstanding disagreement.
So far from supporting the notion that Congress can deprive
an Article IlI court of proper jurisdiction the authority to decide a
legal issue independently, the adequate state ground cases stand
squarely against any such proposition. Those cases fully respect
the fundamental understanding that, as an irreducible minimum,
any court, state or federal, is entitled to decide legal and mixed
issues over which it has ultimate jurisdiction, free of any external
interference. A state court with authority to render a final decision
on a state law issue is absolutely entitled to reach the judgment it
thinks appropriate. And the Supreme Court, with ultimate authority to render a final decision on a properly postured federal question, is also entitled to reach the judgment it finds to be correct-free of any responsibility
to adjust that judgment according
20 1
to the views of a state court.

E. Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding
Finally, there is no analogy in the conventional rule that a federal appellate court will not typically upset a trial court finding of
historical fact, unless it is "clearly erroneous."20 2 Trial court findings of fact, as opposed to determinations of law or mixed questions of law and fact, have always enjoyed a large measure of deference on appeal, for reasons that are well documented in the
Court's decisions. 03
By contrast, the Supreme Court has often recognized that trial
judges are in no better position than appellate judges to identify
and articulate the legal standard applicable to the facts of a case or
to apply the appropriate legal standard to those facts.2 04 There is,
then, no tradition of deference to trial court decisions regarding
purely legal or mixed questions, and arguments for such deference
in isolated circumstances have uniformly failed. As the Supreme
Court has explained: "The obligation of responsible appellate jurisdiction implies the requisite authority to review independently a
201. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1190 (1995) (reiterating the familiar proposition
that state courts are not free to interpret the Constitution at variance from the interpretations of the Supreme Court). Alternatively, these cases have something in common with the
cases on judicial review of administrative action. Here, as there, an Article I court may
validly be asked to accept decisions of another entity-to the extent that entity has independent authority to make the decision in issue.
202. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
203. E.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564 (1985).

204. E.g., Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1991).
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lower court's determinations [of law]." 20 5
The resulting conventional distinction between fact and law
runs deeper even than this in American constitutional law. It rests
not merely on solid, practical, functional grounds-but also on the
fundamental character of judicial power pursuant to Article III.
Bluntly stated, an appellate court can extend significant deference
to trial court findings of fact without surrendering its core responsibility to "say what the law is" with respect to those facts. The
crucial point of the cases on appellate review of fact-finding is not,
then, that Congress has better reasons for instructing appellate
courts to defer to findings of fact than Congress can possibly have
for instructing those courts to defer to trial court conclusions of
law. Rather, the point is that there are basic, Article III reasons
why Congress has always respected the fact/law distinction.
VII.

CONCLUSION

There is no justification for reading into Pub. L. 104-132 a
dramatic transmutation of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
and its place in the machinery of American justice. Instead, this
important new statute can and should be given the meaning its
plain language and context command. After a long absence, Congress has revisited this vexing field of federal courts law, primarily
to make procedural adjustments meant to streamline and expedite
the processing of cases, but also to prescribe statutory answers to
problems the Court had previously addressed via the Teague doctrine-in cases that have now been legislatively overruled.
Within this framework, the interpretation of § 2254(d) that
205. Id. at 231. Accord First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (1995)
(confirming that the "ordinary" standard for reviewing questions of law is the "de novo"
standard-and explaining that "it is undesirable to make the law more complicated by proliferating [more than these conventional] review standards without good reasons").
The discussion of mixed questions in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), is not to the
contrary. The Court in that case did not suggest that an appellate court may properly give
"deferential review" to a lower court judgment regarding a mixed question if it appears that
the lower court is better positioned to decide the relevant mixed issue. Id. at 112. Instead,
the Court held that the identification of an issue (as factual, legal, or mixed) in the first
instance is sometimes influenced by the reviewing court's sense of the better allocation of
judicial authority- "Perhaps much of the difficulty in this area stems from the practical
truth that the decision to label an issue a 'question of law,' a 'question of fact,' or a 'mixed
question of law and fact' is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of analysis." Id.
at 113-14.
A court's judgment about the proper allocation of power may have some effect, then,
but only at the threshold-when the "status" of a question as factual, legal, or mixed is
initially determined. Id. at 114. Once an issue has been identified as mixed, however, Miller
is clear that the issue is a matter for "independent" determination. Id. at 113.
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best fits both its precise text and its obvious history is not, then,
all so startling. This interpretation can be coordinated with the existing statutory and case law structure without undue disruption
and, into the bargain, it raises no serious constitutional difficulty.
The point of § 2254(d) is to dispense with a peculiar understanding of the "de novo" standard that had grown up around federal
habeas corpus for state prisoners-and implied that the federal
courts should ignore prior state judgments entirely. Under this new
provision, however, the federal habeas courts are obliged to focus
explicitly on a previous adjudication on the merits in state court
and to decide forthrightly whether the state court reached the correct outcome.
In the end, then, Pub. L. 104-132 calls on the federal courts to
respect the state courts and their efforts to enforce federal law.
And it doubtless conveys a serious legislative desire that the federal courts exercise restraint in habeas cases. But it does not dismantle the habeas system as some observers, myself included, had
feared it would.

